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Abstract
This thesis aims to identify causal effects using a natural experimental approach.
We focus on the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in midwestern Japan as a source
of exogenous variation in the variables of interest.
Chapter 1 explores the causal effect of schooling on juvenile delinquency us-
ing variation in schooling caused by policy interventions in specific municipalities
after the earthquake. Using the instrumental variable estimator to address endo-
geneity problems arising from simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity, we find
that schooling reduces juvenile delinquency, although some of our estimates have
large standard errors and are imprecisely estimated. The results indicate that a
one-percentage-point increase in the high school participation rate reduces the
number of juvenile arrests by approximately 1.1 per 1,000 youths. 1 Estimates
of social benefits show that it is less expensive to reach a target level of social
benefits by improving schooling than by strengthening police forces.
Chapter 2 studies the causal effect of volunteer work on the mortality of the
elderly. After the earthquake, levels of volunteering increased considerably in
municipalities hit by the earthquake, while other municipalities did not experi-
ence such a sharp increase. This exogenous shift in levels of volunteering is ex-
ploited to address the endogeneity problem associated with estimating the effects
of volunteering. Specifically, unobserved heterogeneity across municipalities that
affects both morality and the level of volunteering, such as the quality of local
health care services, may bias estimates on the effect of volunteering. The results
indicate that volunteering has no significant effect on mortality amongst people in
their 50s and 60s, while it significantly reduces mortality amongst people in their
70s and 80s or older. Evaluated at the mean, the estimate implies that the life of
approximately one person aged 80 or older (out of 186 persons) is saved in a given
year when the number of volunteers increases by 100 (out of 1,911 persons).
1The unconditional mean of the number of juvenile arrests per 1,000 youths is 12.1.
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Preface
During the last few decades, an increasingly large number of studies that use nat-
ural experiments to identify causal effects have been conducted in many different
subject areas, including those of labour, education and health. Revealing causal
effects is useful as it enables us to predict the consequences of changes in policies
or current circumstances.
Natural experiments are situations in which causal variables of interest are ex-
ogenously shifted by, for example, policy changes or natural forces, which allow
researchers to estimate causal effects. Natural-experimental studies use obser-
vational data, unlike experimental studies such as randomised trials where the
treatment is randomly assigned to subjects. Therefore, if the relevant observa-
tional data are already available, natural experiments are a more practical and less
time-consuming method of estimating causal effects than experimental studies.
Moreover, a natural-experimental approach allows the estimation of causal effects
that cannot be conducted in other ways due to, for instance, ethical or practical
reasons. For example, Scholte et al. (2012) study the effect of in utero exposure
to famine on health and labour market outcomes later in life. Due to the food em-
bargo imposed by German forces during 1944 and 1945, individuals in a certain
cohort in the western part of the Netherlands were exposed to famine in utero.
Using the Dutch Hunger Winter famine, Scholte et al. (2012) find that in utero
exposure to famine causes adverse health and labour market outcomes later in
life. Without using a natural-experimental approach, it would be impossible to
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examine such an effect.
However, natural-experimental approaches also face statistical issues that must
be addressed for casual inference to be reliable. Firstly, as researchers have no
control over the assignment of a treatment, the assignment of subjects to treatment
and control groups is rarely random. For example, those likely to benefit from the
treatment may self-select themselves into the treatment group. It could also be
the case that the assignment of the treatment is correlated with some unobserv-
able variables that affect the outcomes of interest. Secondly, there may be other
events occurring at the same time as an experimental treatment that also affect the
outcome variables, and these effects may be falsely attributed to the treatment.
Thirdly, policy changes may occur as a response to changes in outcome variables;
in other words, policy changes could be endogenous. Lastly, trends in treatment
and control groups can be different, which potentially biases the estimated effects
of interest. Finding a suitable comparison group is therefore an essential part of
drawing a valid causal inference. Furthermore, given that researchers have no
control over the assignment of treatments, it is crucial to understand the origin
of the variations used to identify key parameters, and the study must be carefully
designed in a way that approximates a real experiment.2
In this thesis, we exploit several exogenous shocks induced by the Great Hanshin-
Awaji Earthquake to draw causal inferences. The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earth-
quake occurred in Japan on 17th January 1995, with its epicentre in the southern
2Note that the aforementioned problems are major threats to identification among others and
by no means constitute an exhaustive list of potential problems with the natural-experimental
approach.
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part of the Hyogo prefecture. The square in Panel I of Figure 1 indicates the
location of the Hyogo prefecture in Japan, while the cross in Panel II indicates
the location of the epicentre within the Hyogo prefecture. The earthquake was
recorded at a magnitude of 7.3 and reached the maximum possible intensity of
7 on the Japanese intensity scale in the southern part of the Hyogo prefecture.3
The earthquake caused the second largest loss of life in post-war Japan: 6,434
people were killed, 40,092 people were injured, and more than 300,000 people
were evacuated. More than 682,182 houses, factories and shops were destroyed
or burnt down, and vital utility services such as water, electricity, gas and phone
lines were seriously disrupted. Not surprisingly, the earthquake also severely dis-
rupted schooling: 3,883 schools were damaged, leading to a suspension of classes
in the disaster area. A large number of schoolteachers were injured, and many
students lost their houses and guardians. As a result, various relief measures were
adopted to support students, teachers and schools.
In Chapter 1, we use exogenous variation in schooling caused by policy in-
terventions in specific municipalities after the earthquake to explore the causal
effect of schooling on juvenile delinquency. Individual returns to schooling have
been studied extensively, but the social returns to schooling have received less at-
tention. If schooling yields not only individual returns but also social returns –
such as a reduction in crime – then the rationale for policies that encourage indi-
vidual investments in schooling is strengthened. Using the Instrumental Variable
3A seismic intensity of 7 is assigned to quakes strong enough to alter land forms or cause
landslides.
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Figure 1: Hyogo Prefecture and the Epicentre
I. The Hyogo Prefecture
II. The Epicentre in the Hyogo Prefecture
Notes: The square in Panel I indicates the location of the Hyogo prefecture in
Japan. The cross in Panel II shows the location of the epicentre within the Hyogo
prefecture.
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(IV) estimator to address endogeneity problems arising from simultaneity and un-
observed heterogeneity, we find that schooling reduces juvenile delinquency, al-
though some of our estimates have large standard errors and are imprecisely esti-
mated. The results indicate that a one-percentage-point increase in the high school
participation rate reduces the number of juvenile arrests by approximately 1.1 per
1,000 youths.4 Estimates of social benefits show that it is less expensive to reach a
target level of social benefits by improving schooling than by strengthening police
forces.
Chapter 2 explores the causal effect of volunteer work that provides daily as-
sistance to old people on elderly mortality. After the earthquake, the level of
volunteering increased considerably in municipalities hit by the earthquake, while
other municipalities did not experience such a sharp increase. This exogenous
shift in the level of volunteering can be exploited to address the usual endogene-
ity problem associated with estimating the effects of volunteering. Specifically,
unobserved heterogeneity across municipalities that affects both morality and the
level of volunteering, such as the quality of local health care services, may bias es-
timates of the effect of volunteering. Additionally, there may be more volunteers
in municipalities containing a large number of people with a high risk of mortal-
ity, such as the elderly. It is therefore hard to conclude if the level of volunteering
affects mortality or if the converse is the case.
The results indicate that levels of volunteering have no significant effect on
mortality amongst people in their 50s and 60s, while it significantly reduces mor-
4The unconditional mean of the number of arrested youths is 12.1 per 1,000 youths.
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tality amongst people in their 70s and 80s or older. Evaluated at the mean, the
estimate implies that the life of approximately one person aged 80 or above (out
of 186 persons) is saved in a given year when the number of volunteers increases
by 100 (out of 1,911 persons).
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Chapter 1
Education and Crime
The welfare of individuals has been traditionally measured by indicators of wealth
such as income. During the last decade, however, non-monetary indicators of
welfare, such as health and happiness, began to receive more attention (Centre
for Educational Research and Innovation, 2010). Although education is likely to
contribute to the non-monetary welfare of individuals, research on the effect of
education on non-monetary outcomes is relatively scarce. In Chapter 1, among
various non-monetary outcomes, we examine the effect of education on crime.
Crime not only causes physical damage or monetary losses to victims but also
compels governments to expend large amounts of money on law enforcement.
Figure 1.1 shows that spending on public order and safety corresponds to more
than one per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in several OECD countries
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and more than two per cent of GDP in the United States and the United Kingdom
in 2004 (UK Cabinet Office, 2006). Furthermore, police expenditure in England
and Wales grew by nearly 50 per cent in real terms between 1999 and 2009, from
£9.83 billion to £14.55 billion (Mills et al., 2010).
A conventional policy to reduce crime is to increase the severity of punish-
ments or police resources. The effectiveness of these conventional policies, how-
ever, seems to be limited given the underlying complexity of criminal behaviour.
Many criminals commit crimes due to limited knowledge, peer pressure, other
psychological reasons or the lack of formal labour market prospects. If people
use drugs because they feel peer pressure to use them or because they are not fully
aware of the adverse health effects of drugs, introducing tougher sanctions against
the use of a certain drug may just cause people to use other drugs but does not
necessarily reduce the use of drugs.
Traditionally, education has not been regarded as a measure for combating
crime. Reducing crimes by improving education may, however, help to overcome
the limitations of conventional policies by providing potential criminals with,
for instance, knowledge about the consequences of their behaviour, psychoso-
cial skills such as self-control, or better job opportunities in the formal labour
market. Furthermore, education has other positive effects on society not neces-
sarily brought about by other crime fighting measures. For example, education
contributes to better health and political awareness and also improves long-run
economic growth (Barro, 2001; Dee, 2004; Grossman, 2005). These effects may
in turn indirectly contribute to crime reduction.
2
Figure 1.1: Spending on Public Order and Safety in OECD Countries
Notes: The graph indicates spending on public order and safety as percentage of GDP in 2004.
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Despite the enormous potential of education as a crime-reduction method, em-
pirical studies on the effect of education on crime are scarce. Statistical evidence
suggests that there is a negative correlation between education and crime. For
example, amongst black men in the United States in 1980, 4.11 per cent of high
school dropouts were imprisoned, compared to only 0.75 per cent of college grad-
uates (Lochner & Moretti, 2004).
Mere correlations, however, do not necessarily imply causality. In fact, to
establish that education is an effective measure for combating crime, one needs to
illustrate that a better education system does “cause” a reduction in crime. Only
then can governments consider using educational policies as a crime-reduction
measure. In Chapter 1, we aim to establish this causation from a quantitative
standpoint. Additionally, we compute social benefits brought about by reducing
crime through education.
To identify the causal effect of schooling on crime, we exploit exogenous vari-
ation in schooling caused by governmental support granted to students, teachers
and schools in specific municipalities after the earthquake.1 Using exogenous
variation is important because the causal variable considered, schooling, is poten-
tially endogenous. Specifically, unobserved heterogeneity across municipalities,
such as a local labour market condition, may affect local education and crime lev-
1It is worth noting the work of Cipollone & Rosolia (2007) because their estimation technique
is relevant to this chapter. They focus on the effect of the school achievement of boys on that of
girls using a policy intervention triggered by an earthquake that occurred in Southern Italy in 1980
as an instrument for the school achievement of boys. The implemented policy allowed certain
cohorts of males in specific towns affected by the earthquake to be exempt from military service.
Their work is based on town cohort-level analysis, and they find that an increase in male high
school graduation rates significantly increases female graduation rates.
4
els at the same time. People living in a high-crime area may not invest much in ed-
ucation because they obtain a higher return from participating in crime than from
working in a formal sector. If this is the case, the crime level can be negatively
correlated with the educational level even if there is no causal effect of education
on crime. Based on the comparison of the arrest rates between the municipalities
with and without the policy intervention, our results indicate that higher school
attainment levels reduce the number of crimes committed by youth.
The reminder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.1 surveys
the theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between education and
crime, while Section 1.2 explains educational policies and their effects on school-
ing. The identification strategy is discussed in Section 1.3, and definitions of
variables and data sources are presented in Section 1.4. In Section 1.5, we present
the econometric specification and discuss empirical findings, and examine their
robustness in Section 1.6. As crime generates huge social costs, it is interesting
to know how much social benefits are brought about by reducing crime. In Sec-
tion 1.7, we thus compute estimates of social benefits due to reductions in crime
through education. Finally, Section 1.8 concludes the chapter.
1.1 Literature Review
In this section, we first present the theoretical literature exploring the potential
mechanisms of the effect of education on crime. Subsequently, we offer a selected
survey of the empirical literature on the relationship between education and crime.
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1.1.1 Theoretical Literature
Rational Choice Model
Since the pioneering work of Becker (1968), which uses economic theory to
model criminal behaviour, a large number of studies have been conducted on the
economics of crime (Block & Heineke, 1975; Bourguignon et al., 2003; Ehrlich,
1973). Becker’s (1968) work is based on the assumption that individuals are ra-
tional, and it predicts that individuals choose to commit a crime when the returns
exceed the costs of participating in crime.
Nearly a decade later, Ehrlich (1975) explicitly analysed the role of educa-
tion in affecting criminal behaviour within a rational choice model framework.
Ehrlich (1975) regards education as an efficiency parameter that affects the re-
turns from both legal activity and crime. More education increases the returns
from both legal activity and crime. The effect of education on crime thus depends
on the relative size of an increase in the returns from legal activity and crime. If
education increases the return from legal activity more than that from crime, ce-
teris paribus, more education would reduce an individual’s incentive to engage in
crime. Therefore a key element that determines the effect of education on crime is
the difference in the extent to which education affects the returns to legal activity
and crime.
The ideas of Ehrlich (1975) are formalised by other researchers who added a
micro-foundation to the aforementioned intuitions (Huang et al., 2004; Lochner,
2004). For example, Lochner (2004) developed a two-period life-cycle model of
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crime to investigate the interaction among crime, formal employment and edu-
cational choices. In his model, individuals with more education commit fewer
unskilled crimes because they earn higher income in the formal labour market.
In other words, their opportunity costs from forgone work are higher, as are their
expected costs of incarceration.
Behavioural Economic Model and Others
The criminal behaviour of youths is also analysed from perspectives other than the
rational choice framework presented above. Embracing insights from psychology,
O’Donoghue & Rabin (2001) cast doubt on the presumption of the rational choice
model that an individual always behaves in her own best interest. Their model
allows the possibility of an individual to make a mistake and argues that excessive
myopia and projection bias play a role in explaining juvenile delinquency. Partic-
ipation in crime involves a trade-off between short-run benefits (e.g., a monetary
gain) and long-run costs (e.g., losing a job opportunity in the future). An exces-
sively myopic individual pays too little attention to the future consequences of her
current action and thus commits a crime. Furthermore, an individual may under-
estimate the cost of future consequences of his current action and behave in a way
that does not maximise his true well-being. O’Donoghue & Rabin (2001) argue
that education may be a useful tool to reduce juvenile delinquency by providing
youth with information about the risks involved in their current behaviours. For
example, raising perceptions about the cost of being arrested or jailed may help to
reduce youth crime.
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In line with O’Donoghue & Rabin (2001), Witte (1997) argues that education
may change the time preferences of an individual or provide her with the informa-
tion about “rules of the game”, in other words, what is moral or legal. More edu-
cation may thus affect criminal behaviour by enabling her to judge what is moral
or to compute accurately the cost of engaging in crime. Witte (1997) also points
out a possible indirect effect of education on crime: more time spent in school
may provide an individual with less crime prone friends, making the individual
less crime prone. This channel would be more relevant to crimes committed due
to peer pressure.
In summary, every piece of theoretical literature makes the same prediction:
education reduces crime. To investigate whether these theoretical prediction is
supported by empirical evidence, several attempts have been made to empirically
examine the relationship between education and crime.
1.1.2 Empirical Evidence
Descriptive Studies
Witte & Tauchen (1994) focus on young male adults living in Philadelphia and
estimate the effect of high school graduation and time spent in school on the prob-
ability of arrest. Their results from a probit model suggest that high school grad-
uation status is not significantly associated with the probability of arrest, whereas
the proportion of time allocated to school during each year is negatively associated
with the probability of arrest.
8
Using data on males aged between 14 and 21 from the 1980 wave of the Na-
tional Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), Grogger (1998) estimates the effect
of years of education and high school graduation status on property crimes. The
results from a probit model suggest that neither educational measure is signifi-
cantly associated with property crimes.
Lochner (2004) estimates the effect of high school graduation status on the
crimes committed by young male adults using the same data as Grogger (1998).
In their specification, the observable variables such as test scores in mathematics
and verbal ability, and family background are controlled for. These variables are
expected to capture the individual characteristics (e.g., learning ability) that poten-
tially affect criminal behaviour. If these variables do not fully capture the effect of
the individual characteristics on crime, the Maximum Likelihood estimator would
be biased. Using a probit model, Lochner (2004) finds that high school graduation
status is negatively correlated to both property and violent crimes.2
Studies identifying Causal Effects
The negative association between education and crime shown in some early lit-
erature does not necessarily mean education reduces crime. Firstly, unobserved
heterogeneity across individuals such as a variation in learning ability may affect
2It is rather surprising that Grogger (1998) and Lochner (2004) show opposite results using the
same data. It could be due to slightly different definitions of a crime indicator for property crimes,
i.e., Grogger (1998) uses the income-based crime participation dummy whereas Lochner (2004)
uses criminal income and self-reported criminal participation as indicators of property crimes. In
addition, Grogger (1998) does not control for cognitive ability and therefore his estimates may be
biased.
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the decisions on both crime participation and human capital investment. For ex-
ample, an individual with a high learning ability investing intensively in education
may participate in crime less. If it is the case, education and crime show a spurious
negative correlation even if education does not “cause” crime to reduce. Secondly,
the decisions on the participation in crime and human capital investment may be
simultaneously determined. On one hand, education may reduce crime due to, for
example, an increased opportunity cost of committing a crime. On the other hand,
the more an individual spends time committing a crime, the less the individual
may want to spend time to invest in education due to, for example, the increased
probability of being arrested before the benefits of education can be reaped. In or-
der to address the potential endogeneity issues, recent literature has started using
IVs for education to estimate its causal effect on crime.
Lochner & Moretti (2004) is the first paper that attempts to draw inferences on
the causal effect of education on crime. They address the endogeneity of schooling
using the time variation in the number of years of compulsory schooling at state
level as an instrument for schooling. Based on the US census panel data, the first
analysis finds that years of schooling reduce the probability of incarceration of
male adults, while high school graduation status does not have a significant effect
on the probability of incarceration. A limitation of the analysis using incarceration
status is that it does not allow estimating the effect of schooling on the minor
offenses unlikely to result in incarceration (e.g., shoplifting). Moreover, it does
not allow estimating the effect on different categories of crimes.
In order to overcome these issues, based on the US census and FBI crime
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report state level panel data, Lochner & Moretti (2004) estimate the effect of
the average education and the high school graduation rate on the arrest rates of
male adults by crime category. Using the time variation in the number of years
of compulsory schooling as an instrument, Lochner & Moretti (2004) find that
both the average education and the high school graduation rate reduce the arrest
rate, though the IV estimates are not always precisely estimated. The effect of
schooling varies considerably with crime categories: for instance, another year of
education reduces assault by about 29 percent and robbery by about 0.5 percent.
The analysis, however, may be overestimating the effect of schooling to the extent
that more educated individuals are less likely to be incarcerated or arrested.
In order to address this possibility, based on the NLSY cross-sectional data,
they estimate the effect of self-reported years of schooling and high school grad-
uation status on self-reported participation in crime and the experience of being
incarcerated for young male adults. Instead of using an instrument to address
the possibility of endogeneity, test scores of mathematics and verbal ability, and
family backgrounds are included into the analysis to capture the unobserved het-
erogeneity across individuals. The results indicate that both self-reported years of
schooling and high school graduation status significantly reduce the probability of
having an experience of being incarcerated. The results for self-reported participa-
tion in crime are mixed: years of schooling and high school graduation status are
negatively associated with crimes for white males, whereas higher self-reported
schooling is associated with higher crime for black males.
Following the work of Lochner & Moretti (2004), other empirical work ex-
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ploiting IVs is conducted based on the aggregated data. Endogeneity of education
is still a concern since the aggregate level unobserved heterogeneity such as a
local labour market condition may simultaneously affect local educational and
crime levels. For example, people living in a high crime area may not invest much
in education since they get a higher return from drug trafficking than working in a
formal sector, which may cause a spurious negative correlation between education
and crime.
Buonanno & Leonida (2006) attempt to address a potential endogeneity issue
using the system generalised method of moments estimation where the lagged
values of a measure of schooling are used as instruments. Based on regional level
panel data of Italy from 1980 to 1995, they find that average years of schooling
reduce the recorded crime rate for property crimes: a one year increase in average
schooling significantly reduces the property crime rate by 0.9 percentage points.
The effect of another year of schooling is smaller for the total crime rate (that
contains both property and violent crimes) and less precisely estimated. Although
the effect on violent crimes is not reported, this would imply that schooling does
not have as much effect on violent crimes as property crimes (if any).
Machin et al. (2011) estimate the effect of education on crime convictions
using regression discontinuity design. Their analyses are based on data on adults
in England and Wales from 1946 to 1970 from the Offenders Index Database.
Using an exogenous variation in education caused by a change in compulsory
school leaving age law in 1972, they find that an increase in the average age of
leaving school reduces the property crime conviction rate for males. Likewise,
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a decrease in the proportion of people with no educational qualifications reduces
the property crime conviction rate for males. For example, a one percentage point
decrease in the proportion of people with no educational qualifications reduces the
property crime conviction rate by 0.85 percent. Such a relationship is, however,
not observed for the violent crime conviction rate and the conviction rates of every
type of crimes for females.
Although previous literature uses different functional form assumptions, dif-
ferent measures of crime, and data on different countries, education is found to
reduce property crimes, while its effect on violent crimes is mixed.
1.2 Policy Context
To identify the causal effect of schooling, we exploit exogenous variation in school-
ing caused by governmental support granted to students, teachers and schools in
specific municipalities after the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake. This section
explains educational policies and their effects on schooling.
1.2.1 Policies in Focus
Shortly after the earthquake, the government defined disaster areas corresponding
to ten cities and ten towns in the Hyogo prefecture and five cities in Osaka prefec-
ture shown in Figure 1.2. The government applied the Disaster Relief Act (DRA)
to these municipalities and targeted these areas for providing various forms of
13
Figure 1.2: Disaster Relief Act
Notes: The shaded area indicates ten cities and ten towns in the Hyogo prefecture
and five cities in the Osaka prefecture where the Disaster Relief Act was applied.
support.3 Firstly, the government provided textbooks and school supplies to ju-
nior high school students in need of emergency assistance due to the earthquake.
The provision took place from January 1995 to March 1995, and 62,034 students
received textbooks and school supplies.4
Secondly, schoolteachers and their families were also targeted for relief. Schoolteach-
ers and their families whose (i) residences were more than 20 per cent destroyed in
3The types of support are divided into two categories, emergency support and educational
support. The emergency support includes rescue operations, emergency medical support, the burial
of corpses and the provision of asylums, food, water and clothes.
4The figure includes the number of junior high school students and primary school pupils.
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terms of the total area or (ii) family members were dead or injured were exempted
from paying medical bills. As a result, 10,802 exemptions took place between
January 1995 and May 1995.5
Finally, schools in the disaster area were also financially supported. Junior
high schools in the disaster area were subsidised to construct temporary class-
rooms and reconstruct school buildings. The construction of temporary class-
rooms started in February 1995, and a total of 394 classrooms and 255 school
buildings for junior high schools were (re)constructed. Schools were eligible to
receive the subsidies if the total repair or construction costs per school were above
certain thresholds.6
1.2.2 Potential Effects of the Policy Intervention
To understand the effect of the policies on schooling measured by the high school
participation rate, it is necessary to understand the Japanese educational system:
after completing primary school at age 12, every pupil must go on to junior high
school, which lasts for three years. After graduating from a junior high school,
students can choose whether to go on to high school. The policies are, therefore,
expected to have raised the high school participation rate (or to have prevented it
5A total of 1,877 exemptions were recorded for schoolteachers working for private school,
whereas the number of exemptions for schoolteachers working for public schools is unknown.
Hence, we compute the number of exemption for public school teachers assuming that the number
of exemptions per school is identical in private schools and in public schools.
6Threshold repair/construction costs are ¥400k, ¥600k, ¥800k and ¥1,500k for civic, national
prefectural and private schools, respectively. Subsidy rates also vary with types of schools: the
rate is 100 per cent for national schools, 67 per cent for prefectural and civic schools and 50 per
cent for private schools. Although this policy does not have a clearly defined target area, schools
that received subsidies concentrate on municipalities where the DRA was applied.
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Figure 1.3: Timing of the Policy Intervention
Notes: The top arrow indicates the calender year, while the second top arrow shows
the academic year starting from April and ending in March. The cross points the
timing at which the earthquake occurred.
from dropping) by mitigating shocks of the earthquake on schooling.
We now discuss the timing of the effect of the policy intervention on school-
ing. The governmental support for (i) students, (ii) teachers and (iii) schools was
respectively provided from (i) January 1995 to March 1995, (ii) January 1995 to
May 1995 and (iii) February 1995 until the (re)construction of school buildings
was completed. Figure 1.3 summarises the timing of the policy interventions. The
top arrow indicates the calendar year, while the second arrow from the top shows
the academic year starting in April and ending in March. As indicated by the
cross, the earthquake occurred in January 1995 (i.e., the end of the 1994 academic
year). Students in junior high schools at the time of the earthquake were poten-
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tially affected by the policy intervention. Recalling that a junior high school is
a three-year course, students affected by the policies went on to high schools (if
they choose to) in April 1995, 1996 or 1997. The policies therefore potentially
affected the high school participation rate in years 1995, 1996 and 1997.
1.3 Identification Strategy
The nature of the policies outlined in the previous section raises several empir-
ical concerns. Namely, the set of municipalities eligible to receive the govern-
mental support (hereafter, “supported group” for brevity) suffered the damage of
the earthquake at the same time, implying that not only the policies but also the
damage must have affected schooling. To capture the effect of the policies on
schooling, it is thus essential to disentangle the effects of the policies and damage
on schooling.
For this purpose, we drop a subset of municipalities in the supported group
that were heavily damaged and limit our attention to the municipalities least dam-
aged by the earthquake. The damage of the earthquake is measured by the per-
centage of people who died or were injured and households that had their houses
destroyed. A municipality is classified as heavily damaged if one or more damage
measures were recorded above the top 25th percentile value of damage distribu-
tion within the supported group. Given that the distribution of damage is highly
negatively skewed, this rule drops the most damaged municipalities. As a result,
31 municipalities are retained as the treatment group, accounting for 0.001 per
17
cent of the people died, 0.003 per cent of people seriously injured and 0.12 per
cent of households that had their houses fully destroyed. In fact, although the re-
tained municipalities were officially included in the disaster area and targeted by
the policies, a large number of the retained municipalities recorded little damage.
To capture the effect of the policy intervention on schooling, school achieve-
ment in the treatment group could be compared to the rest of municipalities not
eligible to receive any support (hereafter, “non-support group” for brevity). The
municipalities in the non-support group were, however, presumably exposed to
less damage than the municipalities in the treatment group. The difference in de-
grees of damage may bias the estimates of the treatment effect for several reasons.
Firstly, different degrees of damage imply different assignments of other sup-
port related to the earthquake. To the extent that other support also affected
schooling, estimates of the effect of the policy intervention on schooling would
be biased. Secondly, it might be the case that higher damage in a municipality
led to less labour market opportunity for the youth, which in turn encouraged the
students in the highly damaged area to go on to high school. Equally, it could be
the case that higher damage created more job opportunities for, for example, con-
struction work, which encouraged the students in the highly damaged area to enter
the labour market. Either way, the estimates of the effect of policy intervention
would be biased. Thirdly, it is likely that school facilities in the treatment group
were more damaged, resulting in underestimation of the effect of the policies.
To address these concerns, we restrict our attention to a subset of munici-
palities in the non-support group that lie within similar distances from the fault
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line to the municipalities in the treatment group. We measure the orthogonal dis-
tances from the fault line to each municipality in the treatment group and use the
maximum distance as the standard distance. Every municipality lying within the
standard distance from the fault line without the policy intervention is selected as
a control municipality. This rule ensures that treatment and control municipalities
lie within similar distances from the fault line and selects 32 municipalities as a
control group. The final sample thus consists of 63 municipalities in the Hyogo
and Osaka prefectures as presented in Figure 1.4. The cross indicates the epi-
centre, and the faults that caused the earthquake are located along the line lying
from the southwest to the northeast. Not surprisingly, municipalities lying along
the faults that recorded the high level of damage are dropped from the sample.
The retained municipalities suffered the similar degrees of damage, which has
important implications to the identification of the treatment effect.
Firstly, a change in youth labour market conditions according to the different
degrees of damage is taken into account. As municipalities in treatment and con-
trol groups suffered similar degrees of damage, the effect of the earthquake on
youth labour market conditions (if any) would have been similar. Secondly, simi-
lar degrees of damage imply similar assignments of other earthquake-related sup-
port. For example, several cash-transfer schemes for victims were implemented
in the disaster area. These schemes either gave or loaned money to victims to
support the recovery of their lives and distributed money according to the de-
grees of damage that victims suffered. These cash-transfer schemes would have
affected the two groups similarly because they suffered similar degrees of dam-
19
Figure 1.4: Sampled Municipalities
Notes: The cross is the epicentre and the line lying from the southwest to northeast
indicates the faults that caused the earthquake. The black and grey areas correspond
to the treatment and control groups, respectively.
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Table 1.1: Extent of Damage due to the Earthquake
Treatment Control
31 municipalities 32 municipalities
Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err.
# of Deaths per 1,000 pop 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
# of Injury per 1,000 pop 0.20 0.06 0.09 0.04
# of Destroyed hh per 1,000 hh 13.98 6.85 0.06 0.02
Notes: Table reports weighted means. Weights are total population in the first and second rows,
and total households in the third row.
age. Lastly, similar degrees of damage imply similar degrees of destruction in
schooling, which addresses potential underestimation of the treatment effect on
schooling.
Table 1.1 summarises the extent of the damage from the earthquake in the
treated and control municipalities. Table 1.1 indicates that more households
had their houses damaged in the treatment group. Detailed data on the extent
of damage, however, shows that a large number of households in the treatment
group experienced minor damage as opposed to the full destruction of houses.
Regarding loss of life and injury, very few people died or were injured in the two
groups, implying that presumably the direct effects of the earthquake were very
limited.
Panel I of Figure 1.5 plots the fraction of junior high school students who went
on to high school, while Panel II plots the number of juvenile arrests per 1,000
youths. The solid and dotted lines represent the treatment and control groups,
respectively, and the years between two vertical lines correspond to the years in
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Figure 1.5: Schooling and Crime
I. High School Participation Rates
Treatment
Control
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.5
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year
II. Juvenile Arrest Rates (per 1,000 youths)
Treatment
Control
5
10
15
20
1990 1995 2000 2005
year
Notes: Panel I plots the weighted average high school participation rates. Panel II plots the
weighted average youth arrest rates. Weights are the number of junior high school graduates
for Panel I and youth population for Panel II. Solid line: least damaged municipalities eligible to
receive educational support (treatment group). Dotted line: municipalities without the educational
support lying within the similar distances from the fault line to the treated municipalities (control
group). 22
which the high school participation rate is potentially affected by the policy inter-
vention. Panel I indicates that the average high school participation rates of both
groups show upward trends. Particularly, the upward trend in the control group
is steeper prior to the earthquake, leading to underestimation of the effect of the
policies on schooling. After the earthquake, the average high school participation
rate increased in the treatment group in years 1995 and 1996. Moreover, the high
school participation rates fell more in the control group in year 1997. Panel I
supports the possibility that the policies raised the high school participate rate or
prevented it from dropping in the treatment group.
The graph of the juvenile arrest rates shows slightly steeper upward trends in
the treatment group prior to the earthquake and during the period potentially af-
fected by the policy intervention, which may underestimate the effect of schooling
on arrests. Note that the fact that the arrest rate is higher in the treatment group
does not invalidate the identification because the systematic differences in the av-
erage arrest rates are picked up by the municipality fixed effects in the econometric
specification.
1.4 Data and Variables
Crime data for 115 police offices in the Hyogo and Osaka prefectures from 1993 to
2003 are taken from the Statistical Crime Report 1993 to 2003 (Hanzai Tokeisyo).
The crime indicator is defined as the number of arrested youths per 1,000 youths.
An issue is that the number of arrests is recorded by police office but not by age.
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The number of arrested youths in a police office in a prefecture is thus computed
under the assumption that the tendency of the youth to commit a crime relative to
the tendency of the whole population (i.e., youths and adults) to commit a crime
is constant across offices in a prefecture. Details of the computation are presented
in data appendix 1.
Crimes are divided into four categories: total crime, felony, total theft and
non-trespass theft. Total crime includes every act in violation of the criminal
law. Felony consists of murder, robbery, rape and arson. Total theft consists of
three different types of thefts: (i) trespass theft, defined as the unlawful taking of
property from the possession of another by entering a structure to commit a theft,
and (ii) non-trespass theft, defined as vehicle thefts and any theft except trespass
theft (e.g., motorbike theft and luggage lifting).
Data on covariates is available for 163 municipalities in the Hyogo and Os-
aka prefectures from 1993 to 2003. As the data for crimes and covariates have
different units of observations, these data are matched in the manner detailed in
data appendix 2. As a result of matching, the number of municipality-police of-
fice pairs becomes 94. After retaining in the sample only the municipalities lying
within the similar distances from the faults as described in Section 1.3, our sample
consists of observations for 63 municipality-police office pairs in the Hyogo and
Osaka prefectures from 1993 to 2003.
Data on the high school participation rate, defined as the share of junior high
school graduates who go on to high schools, is obtained from the School Ba-
sic Survey Report 1990 to 2000 (Gakko Kihon Chosa Hokokusyo). The survey
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covers every school in Japan and collects information on the number of classes,
students and teachers, budget of a school, careers of graduates, etc. The survey has
been conducted every year since 1948 and is a good source of community-level
information on schooling.
Other data on covariates is obtained from the survey report, the System of
Social and Demographic Statistics (Syakai Jinko Tokei Taikei). The survey cov-
ers every municipality in Japan and collects information on socio-economic and
demographic conditions of municipalities. The survey has been conducted since
1976 and provides 1,500 social and demographic variables by municipality. As
socio-economic indicators, wealth level, job opportunity and welfare generosity
are included. Wealth level is measured by income per capita, and job opportunity
is measured by the unemployment rate. Poverty and less job opportunity would
reduce expected income from legal activities and hence is expected to raise the
level of crime. Welfare generosity, measured by welfare expenditure per capita, is
expected to reduce the level of crime by providing people with an extra income.
Table 1.2 summarises the pre-quake characteristics of the treatment and con-
trol municipalities.7 The number of arrests per 1,000 youths in Panel I indicates
that there are more arrests in treatment municipalities in every crime category.
The higher arrest rate per se does not cause bias as long as the pre-quake trends
are similar in two groups. The graph of the juvenile arrest rate in Panel II of
Figure 1.5 shows the similar trends prior to the earthquake. In the econometric
specification, the systematic differences in the average arrest rates are picked up
7The pre-quake period refers to year < 1995.
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Table 1.2: Pre-Quake Municipality Characteristics
Treatment Control
31 municipalities 32 municipalities
Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err.
I. # Arrests per 1,000 youth population
Total crime 12.47 1.21 7.08 0.91
Felony 0.44 0.60 0.22 0.23
Total theft 6.84 0.72 4.36 0.54
Non-trespass theft 5.84 0.65 3.64 0.47
II. Covariates
% High school 96.24 4.86 95.44 6.98
% Unemployed 5.59 0.48 4.05 0.57
Income per cap 1564.00 125.94 1506.32 177.95
Social welfare expend. per cap 24.78 1.59 14.29 1.68
Notes: Panel I reports weighted means using youth population as a weight. Income and social
welfare per capita are the average annual values in ¥1,000. Panel II reports weighted means using
total population as a weight except the high school participation rate where the number of junior
high school graduates are used as a weight.
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by the municipality fixed effects. Schooling and socio-economic characteristics
shown in Panel II indicate the higher school attainment, the unemployment rate,
income per capita and social welfare expenditure per capita in the treatment mu-
nicipalities. However, the differences in the means are not statistically different
from zero for the high school participation rate and income per capita. In contrast,
the unemployment rate and social welfare expenditure are statistically different
from zero, which potentially biases the results. The differences in unemployment
rate and per capita social welfare expenditure are, however, statistically constant
across pre- and post-earthquake periods, implying that these differences are ab-
sorbed by the municipality fixed effects.
1.5 Specification and results
We now present the specification of the model and discuss the findings. This
study investigates the effect of schooling on juvenile delinquency by regressing
a measure of juvenile crime on a measure of schooling, controlling for various
socio-economic indicators. The following model is set up:
Crimemt = αSchoolmt−3 +X
′
mtβ +νm +µt +umt (1.1)
where Crimemt represents the number of juvenile arrests per 1,000 youths munic-
ipality m in year t (hereafter, “the arrest rate” for brevity), where “youths” refers
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to individuals aged between 18 and 19. Schoolmt−3 is the fraction of junior high
school students who went on to high school in year t− 3. The high school par-
ticipation rate enters equation (1.1) with a three-period-lag because an individual
who entered high school in year t−3 graduates in year t at age 18.8 β is the vector
of parameters for the time varying covariates, Xmt . νm and µt are the municipality
and year fixed effects, respectively, and umt represents the disturbance term.
The main coefficient of interest is α , which measures the effect of schooling on
crime. An econometric issue in the estimation of equation (1.1) is that schooling
is potentially endogenous. Specifically, unobserved heterogeneity across munici-
palities, such as a local labour market condition, may simultaneously affect local
educational and crime levels . People living in a high crime area may not invest
much in education because they get a higher return from participating in crime
than working in a formal sector. If this is the case, α can be negative even if there
is no causal effect of education on crime.
We begin by estimating equation (1.1) using the WG estimator to deal with a
possible correlation between the high school participation rate and the municipal-
ity fixed effects, νm. Table 1.3 presents the WG estimates of regressions in which
the arrest rate is regressed on the high school participation rate and other con-
trols between 1993 and 2003.9 The WG estimates in Table 1.3 indicate that the
8Schooling in period t can potentially affect the criminal behaviour in period t +x where x≥ 4.
However, those who entered high school in period t are aged 20 or above at period t + x where
x ≥ 4. A crime committed by those aged 20 or above is classified as an adult crime according
to Japanese criminal law. Since our interest lies in estimating the effect of schooling on juvenile
delinquency, we use equation (1.1) where the measure of schooling enters with a three-period-lag.
9Note that the arrest rate reflects not only occurrences of crime but also the effort and resources
of police, as not every criminal is arrested. The arrest rate thus does not necessarily accurately
reflect the actual level of crime. However, the effort level of police in a municipality is unlikely
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Table 1.3: Effects of Schooling on Juvenile Delinquency (WG estimates)
Dependent variable # of juvenile arrests per 1,000 youths
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crime category total crime total theft felony non-trespass
% High school -0.114 -0.036 -0.039* -0.038
(0.170) (0.089) (0.020) (0.083)
Controls yes yes yes yes
Municip. FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
# of Obs. 693 693 693 693
# of Municp. 63 63 63 63
R-squared 0.318 0.239 0.318 0.246
Notes: Table reports estimated coefficients on α in equation (1.1). Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered by municipality. * denotes p<0.1. Labels of the dependent variables indicate the
following. Total crime: any act in violation of the criminal law; total theft: any kind of theft;
felony: homicide, robbery, arson and rape; non-trespass theft: vehicle theft and the theft without
entering a structure. Controls included are the municipality fixed effects, year fixed effects, logged
income per capita, unemployment rate and logged welfare expenditure per capita.
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high school participation rate is negatively associated with every type of crime,
although its effects are statistically insignificant except for felony. Column (3) in-
dicates that a one-percentage-point increase in the high school participation rate is
associated with an approximately 0.04 decrease in the number of juvenile felony
arrests per 1,000 youths.
The WG estimator is inconsistent if the disturbances, umt , and the high school
participation rate are correlated. A consistent estimator for α can be obtained by
using the IV estimator that requires an instrument for schooling. This chapter uses
an exogenous variation in schooling caused by the policy intervention outlined in
Section 1.3. We begin by estimating the first-stage equation of equation (1.1)
where the high school participation rate is instrumented with the educational poli-
cies, dummies that equal one if municipality m belongs to the treatment group and
year is 1995, 1996 or 1997, and zero otherwise. The treatment dummies reflect
the effect of the policy intervention on the high school participation rate and are
therefore expected to be positive.
Table 1.4 reports the first-stage estimates of the effect of the policy interven-
tion. Column (1) controls for the municipality and year fixed effects, while Col-
umn (2) additionally controls for the socio-economic indicators. The first-stage
results in both columns show that the high school participation rate in the treat-
ment group was lower in 1995, although the effect is insignificant. This is not
to sharply change over time, in which case the effort level is captured by the municipality fixed
effects. The amount of police resources in a municipality is more likely to change over time
depending on the economic condition of the municipality. We therefore control for income level
in the regression equation.
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Table 1.4: Effects of Educational Policies on the High School Participation Rate
Dependent variable: High school participation rate
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment 1995 -0.270 -0.255 -
(0.162) (0.165) -
Treatment 1996 0.086 0.107 -
(0.134) (0.139) -
Treatment 1997 0.371*** 0.393*** 0.409***
(0.151) (0.153) (0.150)
Controls no yes yes
Municip. FE yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
# of Obs. 693 693 693
# of Municp. 63 63 63
R-squared 0.794 0.796 0.795
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by municipality. *** denotes
p<0.01. Treatment 1995, Treatment 1996 and Treatment 1997 are dummies that
equal one in 1995, 1996 and 1997, respectively, in the treated municipalities, and
zero otherwise. Controls included are the municipality fixed effects, year fixed ef-
fects, logged income per capita, unemployment rate and logged welfare expenditure
per capita.
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surprising given that the earthquake occurred in mid-January 1995 and the high
school participation rate was observed at the end of March, implying that presum-
ably not enough time had passed since the policy was implemented and therefore
the disaster area was still in turmoil. Columns (1) and (2) indicate that high school
participation rates were higher in the treatment group in 1996 and 1997. The es-
timated treatment effect in 1997 is statistically significant at one per cent, while
the estimated effect in 1996 is insignificant. Since the IV estimator with uninfor-
mative instruments is known to be biased toward OLS, we do not use treatment
dummies 1995 and 1996 as instruments given that they do not have any predic-
tive power. After omitting treatment dummies 1995 and 1996 from the first-stage
equation, the coefficient on treatment dummy 1997 is 0.409 with a t-statistic of
2.73 (F-statistic 7.5). The coefficient estimate implies that the high school partic-
ipation rate was higher in treated municipalities by approximately 0.409 percent-
age points in 1997.
Finally, Table 1.5 presents the second-stage estimates of the effect of schooling
on the arrest rate using treatment dummy 1997 as an instrument. Columns (1) to
(4) report the effect on the arrest rate for total crimes, total theft, felony and non-
trespass theft, respectively, controlling for the municipality and year fixed effects.
Columns (1) to (4) indicate that the high school participation rate reduces the
arrest rate for every type of crime. Columns (1) to (4) are correctly specified
if every difference across municipalities is time invariant. If the time varying
observable characteristics also affect the arrest rate, however, columns (1) to (4)
are misspecified.
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Another possible issue with columns (1) to (4) is a selection bias. Namely, the
assignment of municipalities to a treatment group might be endogenous. For ex-
ample, poor municipalities with fragile infrastructures may be severely damaged
by the earthquake and, consequently, more likely to be targeted by the policies.
The level of crime in those poor municipalities may be high due to few opportu-
nities in the formal labour market, for example. If that is the case, estimates of
the effect of schooling on the arrest rate would be biased. It is therefore essential
to control for socio-economic characteristics in addition to the municipality fixed
effects.
To allow for the possibility that time varying socio-economic characteristics
affect the arrest rate and also to account for a possible selection bias, we control
for income, unemployment rate and social welfare expenditure in columns (5) to
(8). The results are not sensitive to the inclusion of these variables, and the mag-
nitude of the estimates (in absolute terms) is greater for total crime and felony.
Column (5) indicates that a one-percentage-point increase in the high school par-
ticipation rate reduces the number of total arrests per 1,000 youths by approxi-
mately 1.1 on average.
Table 1.5 shows that every estimate is not statistically significant at conven-
tional significance levels. A possible econometric issue here is that the estimation
may be suffering from a weak instrument problem, meaning that the instrument
and the high school participation rates are not highly correlated enough. There
may be not much variation left for the policy intervention to affect high school
participation rates because the rates are already high in our sample. With a weak
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instrument, IV estimates from a just-identified model tend to be too imprecise
(Angrist & Pischke, 2009). Stock et al. (2002) compute the critical value for
the weak instrument test based on the first-stage F statistic and suggest that the
F statistic above approximately 10 makes IV inference reliable. As our first-stage
F statistic is 7.5, a weak instrument problem is possibly a cause of the estimates
being imprecise in Table 1.5. However, the IV estimator in a just-identified model
is known to be approximately unbiased. In other words, even with a weak instru-
ment, the IV estimator in a just-identified model is approximately centred around
the true parameter.
Another possible econometric reason for the insignificant effects is a small
sample size. Due to the nature of the identification strategy detailed in Section 1.3,
the results are based on the restricted sample, leading to high standard errors. Fur-
thermore, the estimates in Table 1.5 are identified from variations in schooling
in the municipalities intervened by the policies, implying that the identification
comes from a much smaller sample than the actual sample. Despite these limita-
tions, however, it is worth emphasising that the signs of our estimated coefficients
of interest are robust to regression specifications and consistent with theoretical
predictions and existing empirical literature.
1.6 Robustness Checks
In this section, the robustness of the results obtained in the previous section is
examined. To address a concern that the results are a product of mere coinci-
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dence by retaining a certain set of municipalities in the sample, the results using
an alternative definition of the control group are presented. Recall that, in the pre-
vious section, we retained a subset of municipalities in the supported group that
were least damaged as the treatment group and those in the non-support group
lying within the similar distances from the faults to treatment group. As the re-
tained municipalities were exposed to similar degrees of damage, the effect of the
earthquake or earthquake-related interventions would have been similar across the
treatment and control municipalities.
Another way of defining the control group is to use measures on the earth-
quake damage instead of using geographical distance measures. Figure 1.6 shows
a distinction of municipalities in the Hyogo and Osaka prefectures according to
their damage status and eligibility to receive the support. The black area indicates
municipalities in the supported group, while the grey area indicates municipalities
not targeted by the policies despite being damaged by the earthquake. Compar-
ing those damaged municipalities targeted and not targeted by the policies would
allow us to identify the effect of the policies on schooling.
However, a potential issue with this approach is that, even after restricting
our attention to the damaged municipalities, there might be a difference in the
extent of damage among municipalities with positive levels of damage. Precisely,
the municipalities in the supported group were more damaged. The difference in
degrees of damage may bias the results, as discussed previously. We thus further
restrict our sample and drop a subset of municipalities in the supported group that
are heavily damaged and those in the non-support group that are least damaged.
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Figure 1.6: Municipalities by Damage Status and Treatment Eligibility
Notes: The black area corresponds to municipalities targeted by the policy intervention,
while the grey area indicates municipalities not targeted by the intervention despite being
damaged by the earthquake.
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A municipality in the supported group is classified as heavily damaged if one
or more damage indicators were recorded above the top 25th percentile value of
damage distribution within the supported group. Likewise, a municipality in the
non-support group is classified as least damaged if one or more damage indica-
tors were recorded below the bottom 25th percentile value of damage distribu-
tion within the non-support group.10 This rule selects 31 municipalities in the
supported group as the treatment group and 27 municipalities in the non-support
group as the control group (see Figure 1.7). As the distance from the fault line is
highly correlated with the degrees of damage, it is not surprising that the sampled
municipalities greatly overlap with those in Section 1.3.
Panel I of Table 1.6 reports the first-stage estimates where a treatment dummy
is used as an instrument for the high school participation rate. The treatment
dummy equals one if a municipality belongs to the treatment group and the year
is 1997 and zero otherwise. As in Table 1.5, treatment dummies 1995 and 1996
are not included in the analysis because they do not have any predictive power.
The first column controls for the municipality and year fixed effects, while the
second column additionally controls for socio-economic characteristics. The co-
efficient estimates presented in Panel I are larger than the corresponding estimates
in Table 1.4. For example, the estimated treatment effect is now 0.483 with a
t-statistic of 2.84 (F-statistic 8.1) in the second column, implying that the high
school participation rate was higher in treated municipalities by approximately
0.483 percentage points in 1997.
10Our result is not sensitive to this particular cut-off value.
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Figure 1.7: Sampled Municipalities using Alternative Selection Rule
Notes: The cross is the epicentre and the line lying from the southwest to
northeast indicates the faults that caused the earthquake. The black area in-
dicates the least damaged municipalities among those targeted by the policy
intervention (the treatment group), while the grey area corresponds to heav-
ily damaged municipalities among those not targeted by the intervention (the
control group).
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Table 1.6: Robustness Checks
I. First-stage estimates
(1) % High school 0.460*** 0.483***
(0.168) (0.170)
II. IV estimates
(2) Total crime -0.660 -0.671
(1.103) (0.968)
(3) Total theft -0.795 -0.551
(0.845) (0.714)
(4) Felony -0.164 -0.219*
(0.108) (0.121)
(5) Non-trespass -0.783 -0.578
(0.846) (0.731)
Controls no yes
Municip. FE yes yes
Year FE yes yes
# of Obs. 572 572
# of Municp. 52 52
F-statistics 7.5 8.1
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by municipality. *** denotes
p<0.01 and * refers to p<0.1. Dependent variables are the high school participation
rate in panel I, and the number of arrests per 1,000 youths in panel II. Refer to
Table 1.3 for labels of crime category. Controls included are the municipality fixed
effects, year fixed effects, logged income per capita, unemployment rate and logged
welfare expenditure per capita. The F-statistics on the excluded instrument are
reported.
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Panel II of Table 1.6 presents the IV estimates of the effect of the high school
participation rate on the arrest rates. The results are qualitatively unaffected by
the change in the definition of the control group: the higher high school partici-
pation reduces every type of crime, although the effect is not precisely estimated.
An exception is the estimate on felony, which has now become significant (p-
value 0.07). The estimate on felony in row (4) of Table 1.6 indicates that a one-
percentage-point increase in the high school participation rate reduces the number
of arrests per 1,000 youths by approximately 0.22.
1.7 Social Savings through Crime Reduction
As crime generates huge social costs, it is interesting to know how much social
benefits are brought about by reducing crime through education. In this section,
two important questions for policy making are addressed: (i) Do policy benefits
exceed costs? (ii) Would a policy to increase police resources yield the same im-
pact at less cost? To tackle these questions, we present the social saving estimates
from crime reduction due to a one-percentage-point increase in the high school
participation rate in the Hyogo and Osaka prefectures.11 The social saving es-
timates presented in this section must be interpreted with the following several
caveats.
Firstly, general equilibrium effects are not taken into account. On one hand,
11After retaining in the sample only the municipalities exposed to similar degrees of damage
as described in Section 1.3, our sample consists of observations for 63 municipality-police office
pairs. The estimates presented thus correspond to those in the retained municipalities (i.e., a subset
of municipalities in the Hyogo and Osaka prefectures).
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increasing the high school graduation rate, for example, may increase the crimes
committed by high school graduates to the extent that an increase in high school
graduates reduces the wage of high school graduates. If this were the case, the
social saving estimates would be overestimated. On the other hand, a decrease in
the supply of high school dropouts may raise the wage of high school dropouts,
which in turn reduces the crimes committed by high school dropouts. If this
were the case, the social saving estimates would be underestimated. However,
Lochner & Moretti (2001) show that the net general equilibrium effect of increas-
ing schooling on crime is negligible. Furthermore, the general equilibrium effects
potentially bias social saving estimates only if education affects crime through a
change in labour market opportunities. If education affects crime due to a change
in time preferences or an increase in the knowledge about the consequences of
crime, the general equilibrium effects would not be relevant to the estimation of
social savings.
Secondly, the social savings from crime reduction are estimated as a result
of a one-percentage-point increase in the high school participation rate from ap-
proximately 96 per cent to 97 per cent.12 On one hand, the social savings may
be overestimated to the extent that those affected by the policy are crime-prone
individuals with a low level of educational. On the other hand, the social savings
may be underestimated to the extent that there is a decreasing return to school-
ing. Thirdly, the social benefits of increasing the high school participation rate are
12The average high school participation rate in the treatment group before the earthquake is
96.24 per cent.
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evaluated for a year. To the extent that raising the high school participation rate
has a long-run effect, the social saving estimates may be underestimated.
Lastly, due to data limitations, the estimate of costs per crime does not contain
intangible costs such as the costs associated with mental stress and productivity
losses. Costs per crime consists of (i) costs for crime prevention, (ii) costs in
response to crime (e.g., incarceration costs) and (iii) costs as a consequence of
crime (e.g., compensation for damage) as detailed in Appendix 3. The social sav-
ing estimates would thus be underestimated because the intangible cost is likely to
account for a significant part of cost per crime. Despite the limitations of the ex-
ercise, we estimate the social savings to provide a rough idea of how much social
benefits are generated by increasing the high school participation rate.
Panel I of Table 1.7 presents estimated changes in arrests and actual crimes as
a result of an increase in schooling. Given that 67 per cent of actual crimes are
reported to police and 16 per cent of reported crimes are cleared up, a 233 reduc-
tion in arrests implies an estimated 2,248 reduction in actual crimes.13 Panel II
presents the benefits of crime reduction through schooling and indicates that the
social savings due to a reduction in crimes is ¥1,078 million. A total of 87,524
students went on to high schools in the year 2000 in the sample area, and an ad-
ditional 904 students would have raised the high school participation rate by one
13Not every reported crime results in the arrest of criminals due to, for example, the limited
ability of the criminal justice system. Likewise, not every actual crime is reported to police due
to the reluctance of people to report crimes, for example. According to the international crime
victimisation survey in 2000, 67 per cent of crimes are reported to police. The survey covers
all of Japan and is not focused only on the Hyogo and Osaka prefectures. The estimate is thus
computed assuming that the tendency of people to report crimes to the police in the Hyogo and
Osaka prefectures is the same as the tendency across Japan.
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Table 1.7: Social Savings through Crime Reduction
I: Estimated change in arrests/crimes
Change in arrests 233
Change in actual crimes 2,248
II: Benefit of crime reduction through schooling (¥1,000)
Average cost per crime 479
Benefit from 1pp increase in schooling 1,077,561
Cost of 1pp increase in schooling 705,823
Net benefit 371,738
III: Cost of crime reduction using police forces (¥1,000/officers)
Average cost per police officer 17,616
Required number of police officers 178
Cost to increase police officers 3,135,648
Notes: All costs are inflated to represent 2003 real prices using the Consumer Price Index except
the cost of increasing schooling that is evaluated at 2000 as an increase in education at period t
has an effect on crime at period t+3. Strictly speaking, therefore, the social savings reaped in 2003
have to be evaluated by the present discounted value in 2000. However, the interest rates during
the periods concerned in Japan were extremely low ranging from 0.15 to 0.25 percent. The effect
of the interest rates is thus omitted in the analysis. Costs and benefits are expressed in ¥1,000.
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percentage point. Given that attending high schools costs ¥781 thousand per head
annually on average (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Tech-
nology, 2002), an additional 904 students would have cost about ¥706 million,
yielding the net social savings of ¥372 million.
An important caveat is that the calculation of the cost of raising the high school
participation rate does not include foregone earnings. If the foregone earnings of
¥1 million per annum per head is added to the direct cost of schooling, raising
the high school participation rate costs about ¥ 1,615 million.14 The net effect
of raising the schooling level is thus in a deficit of ¥538 million. However, it is
important to note that crime reduction is one of the numerous effects of schooling.
Among others, education also contributes to better health, political awareness, and
long-run economic growth (Barro, 2001; Dee, 2004; Grossman, 2005). These by-
products may in turn indirectly contribute to crime reduction.
Panel III presents the cost of crime reduction using police forces. Hiring an
additional officer costs an estimated ¥17,616 thousand annually, generating a so-
cial savings of ¥3 million due to crime reduction.15 To yield the same amount of
social savings resulting from a one-percentage-point increase in the high school
14Foregone earnings of participating in the high school are measured by the average annual
earnings of workers who did not graduate from the high school.
15Levitt (1997) reports that an additional police officer imposes non-salary overhead costs of
a roughly equal magnitude as salary. The average salary of a police officer in Japan is ¥8,808
thousand (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2004), yielding the estimated average
cost of ¥17,616 thousand for hiring additional officer. Levitt (1997) estimates that property and
violent crimes decrease by 1.6 and 3.2, respectively, per additional officer in the US. Given that
a property crime and a violent crime cost an estimated ¥71 thousand and ¥1,853 thousand on
average, respectively, an additional officer in Japan yields social savings of ¥6 million under the
assumption that the decrease in crime per additional officer is the same in the US and Japan.
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participation rate (¥1,078 million), an additional 178 police officers are required.
An additional 178 police officers cost about ¥3,136 million, which is far more
expensive than the cost of raising the high school participation rate, ¥706 million
(without foregone earnings) or ¥1,615 million (with forgone earnings).16
1.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we explore the causal effect of schooling on juvenile delinquency.
To identify the effect of schooling, we use exogenous variation in schooling caused
by a policy intervention in specific municipalities after the Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake. Before summarising the results, we mention several caveats for in-
terpretation.
The estimates have high standard errors; thus, they are often not statistically
significant at conventional significance levels. A possible reason for the high stan-
dard errors is a weak instrument. The F-statistics on the excluded instrument range
between 7.5 and 8. With a weak instrument, IV estimates from a just-identified
model tend to be too imprecise (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). However, the IV esti-
mator in a just-identified model is known to be approximately centred around the
true parameter.
Another possible econometric reason for the insignificant effects is a small
sample size. Due to the nature of the identification strategy, the results are based
16If the non-salary overhead cost of hiring an additional officer is excluded from the calculation,
hiring 178 police officers costs roughly ¥1,571 million, still approximately double the cost of
raising the high school participation rate.
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on the restricted sample. Furthermore, the coefficient of interest is identified from
variations in schooling in the municipalities intervened by the policies, implying
that the identification comes from a much smaller sample than the actual sample.
Despite the limitations, however, it is worth emphasising that the signs of our
estimated coefficients of interest are robust throughout the analyses and consistent
with theoretical predictions and existing empirical literature.
Based on the comparison of municipalities with and without the policy inter-
vention, we find that the policies raised the high school participation rate in the
affected municipalities by approximately 0.41 percentage points. Subsequently,
the total number of juvenile arrests in those affected municipalities was lowered
by approximately 1.09 per 1,000 youths.17 The negative impact of schooling on
crime is consistent with rational choice models predicting that higher educational
attainment reduces crimes through a higher opportunity cost of committing crimes
(Ehrlich, 1975; Huang et al., 2004; Lochner, 2004). Likewise, the results are also
consistent with a behavioural economic model predicting that education reduces
crime by affecting the time preferences of individuals or enabling them to more
accurately compute the cost of engaging in crimes (O’Donoghue & Rabin, 2001).
To assess the cost-effectiveness of schooling as a means of reducing crime, we
provide the evidence of how much society can save by reducing crime through ed-
ucation. The results indicate that increasing educational attainment yields positive
social benefits. Furthermore, we find that it is less expensive to reach a target level
17The unconditional means of the high school participation rate and the number of arrests per
1,000 youths are 96.1 per cent and 12.1, respectively.
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of social benefits by improving schooling than by strengthening police forces. It is
also important to note that education has other positive effects on society not nec-
essarily brought about by strengthening police forces, such as improving health
and political awareness and enhancing long-run economic growth (Barro, 2001;
Dee, 2004; Grossman, 2005). A policy that encourages schooling would thus be
an attractive supplement to the traditional methods of combating juvenile delin-
quency that increase formal deterrence.
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1.9 Data Appendix
Appendix 1: Computation of the Number of Juvenile Arrests
The crime indicator is defined as the number of juvenile arrests per 1,000 youths.
The number of arrests is recorded by police office but not by age. We therefore
compute the number of juvenile arrests in police office o in prefecture p under the
following assumption.
Assumption: the youth arrest rate relative to the total arrest rate is constant across
offices in prefecture p
arrestyo/pop
y
o
(arrestao +arrest
y
o)/(popao + pop
y
o)
=
∑
o
arrestyo/∑
o
popyo
∑
o
(arrestao +arrest
y
o)/∑
o
(popao + pop
y
o)
(1.2)
where the superscripts y and a refer to youth and adult, respectively. The left-hand
side corresponds to “the number of arrested youths over the youth population” rel-
ative to “the number of the total arrests over the total population” in office o in
prefecture p. The right-hand side is the same fraction in prefecture p after aggre-
gated up across o. Underscript p is suppressed from equation (1.2) for brevity.
The assumption essentially means that the tendency of youths to commit a crime
relative to the whole population is constant across offices in a prefecture. Equa-
tion (1.2) can be re-arranged to obtain the number of arrested youths in office o in
prefecture p:
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which, in words, means “youth arrests in office o in prefecture p = [total youth
arrests in prefecture p]× [office o share of total arrests in prefecture p]× [inverse
of office o population share] × [office o youth population share]”. Underscript p
is suppressed from equation (1.3) for brevity. As data on every component of the
right-hand side of equation (1.3) is available, the number of youth arrests in office
o in prefecture p is computed using equation (1.3).
Appendix 2: Matching of Data
Data on crime is available for 115 police offices in the Hyogo and Osaka prefec-
tures, while data on covariates is available for 163 municipalities in the Hyogo
and Osaka prefectures. As the data for crimes and covariates have different units
of observations, these data are matched in the following manners.
Case A: One police office covers several municipalities
The data for covariates in levels are summed, and the data for covariates in rates
are subsequently computed. For example, assume that police office A covers mu-
nicipalities B and C. To compute the unemployment rate defined by the share of
the unemployed to total labour force, in the first step, the numbers of the unem-
ployed and total labour force, respectively, in municipalities B and C are summed.
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In the second step, the total number of the unemployed in municipalities B and
C is divided by the total number of labour force in municipalities B and C. In
the third step, the unemployment rate obtained is matched with the crime data of
police office A.
Case B: One municipality is covered by several police offices
The crime data in levels are summed, and the crime rates are subsequently com-
puted. For example, assume that municipality A is covered by police offices B and
C. To compute the crime rate defined by the number of crimes per 1,000 youths, in
the first step, the number of crimes reported to police offices B and C are summed.
In the second step, the total number of crimes reported in police offices B and C
is divided by the total number of youths in city A (and multiplied by 1,000), and
the crime rate obtained is subsequently matched with covariates data of city A.
As a result of matching, the number of municipality-police office pairs becomes
94. After retaining in the sample only the municipalities exposed to similar de-
grees of damage as described in Section 1.3, our sample consists of observations
for 63 municipality-police office pairs in the Hyogo and Osaka prefectures from
1993 to 2003.
Appendix 3: Calculation of Costs per Crime
Costs per crime consist of (i) costs for crime prevention, (ii) costs in response to
crime (e.g., incarceration costs) and (iii) costs as a consequence of crime (e.g.,
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compensation for damage). Due to data limitations, the estimates of costs per
crime do not contain intangible costs such as the costs associated with mental
stress and productivity losses.
Costs for crime prevention consist of the expenditure on crime preventative
activities by probation officers (Ministry of Justice, 2010) and does not contain
the expenditure on private insurances or other fees borne by individuals to protect
themselves. Costs in response to crime consist of incarceration costs, probation
costs, lawyers’ fees, police activities, subsistence and medical fees for those in
custody (Cabinet Office, 2006). Costs as a consequence of crime consist of com-
pensation for damage and legal aid for victims (Cabinet Office, 2008). Table 1.8
presents all costs included in the calculation. To make figures comparable, every
figure is adjusted to 2003 values using the Consumer Price Index in case figures
for 2003 are not available.
Table 1.8: Costs of Crime
¥million
Costs for crime prevention: Prevention 598
Costs in response to crime: Incarceration, probation 52,513
Lawyers fees 7,900
Subsistence, medicine 9,354
Police activity 19,591
Costs as a consequence of crime: Compensation for damage 9,226
Total 99,183
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Chapter 2
Volunteer Work and Mortality
Millions of people across the world work for free. More than a quarter of citizens
in Japan and the United States and more than 40 per cent of citizens in the United
Kingdom participate in volunteer work.1 Although volunteer work is expected to
benefit society, formal research on its potential benefit is scarce. If volunteer work
has no significant impact on the well-being of society, allocating time to different
activity might be a more efficient allocation of resources. Among various types of
volunteer work, this study focuses on the effect of volunteer work providing daily
assistance to the elderly on elderly mortality.
Clarifying this effect is important for several reasons. Firstly, longer and
healthier lives are an obvious source of an individual’s happiness; thus, the poten-
1Japanese, UK and US data are from the Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities, the
Citizenship Survey and the Current Population Survey, respectively. The figures are proportions
of people who engaged in volunteer work at least once in the past 12 months.
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tially significant impact endorses the importance of volunteer activity. Secondly,
given global population ageing, health care expenditures are likely to rise further;
hence, clarifying the contribution of volunteering to longevity and better health is
important for the overall maintenance of society. Lastly, List & Lucking-Reiley
(2002), based on their study of charitable giving, suggest that people donate more
money if they believe that their contribution helps achieve the goal of the charity.
To the extent that the same mechanism holds for donations of time to a charity,
clarifying the outcomes of volunteer work may affect people’s decisions to volun-
teer.
A major challenge to identify the causal effect of volunteering on mortality
is endogeneity of volunteering. There may be more volunteers in municipalities
with a large number of people with a high risk of mortality such as the elderly. It
is thus hard to conclude if the level of volunteering affects mortality or vice versa.
Equally, unobserved heterogeneity across municipalities that affects both mortal-
ity and the level of volunteering (e.g., the quality of local health care services)
may bias estimates of the effect of volunteering.
To identify the causal effect of volunteering on mortality, we use exogenous
variation in volunteering caused by the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake, which
occurred in the midwestern part of Japan in 1995. The level of volunteering con-
siderably increased in municipalities hit by the earthquake, while other munici-
palities with no damage did not experience such a sharp increase in volunteering.
Based on a comparison of mortality between the municipalities with and without
damage, our results indicate that a one-percentage-point increase in the number
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of volunteers reduces the number of deaths of those aged 80 or above by approx-
imately 0.14 per cent. Evaluated at the mean, the estimate implies that approxi-
mately one life of people aged 80 or older (out of 186 persons) is saved in a given
year when the number of volunteers increases by 100 (out of 1,911 persons). Al-
though the nature of the data does not allow us to determine if the reduction is
driven by a reduction in the mortality of volunteers or care recipients, supporting
evidence suggests that the reduction is likely to have occurred among care recipi-
ents. A series of robustness checks are conducted to ensure that the results are not
driven by direct effects of the earthquake.
To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first paper to examine the
causal effect of volunteering on its outcome with (we argue) a credible identifica-
tion strategy. Rather surprisingly, the effects of volunteering, especially its effect
on the recipients of volunteer service, are overlooked despite its enormous poten-
tial effects given the scale and popularity of volunteer activity. Previous research
on volunteering conducted by economists primarily focuses on determinants of
the supply of volunteer labour, seeking to understand why people work for noth-
ing (Day & Devlin, 1998; Duncan, 1999; Freeman, 1997; Menchik & Weisbrod,
1987). Previous studies most closely related to this topic are those on donations of
money, as opposed to time, to charity that investigate people’s motivations to do-
nate and optimal ways of fund-raising (Andreoni, 1989, 1990; Benabou & Tirole,
2006; DellaVigna et al., 2012; Fong & Luttmer, 2009; Grossman, 2010; Landry
et al., 2006; Shang & Croson, 2009; Vesterlund, 2003).
The outcomes of volunteer work have been analysed by social scientists in
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other disciplines such as gerontology, sociology and psychology. Their primary
focus is on its effect on the well-being and mental health of volunteers themselves
such as happiness, life satisfaction, self-reported health and depression (Morrow-
Howell et al., 2003; Musick & Wilson, 2003; Piliavin & Siegl, 2007; Thoits &
Hewitt, 2001; Van Willigen, 2000; Young & Glasgow, 1998). Among these stud-
ies, there are several papers particularly focusing on the effect of volunteer work
on mortality (Harris & Thoresen, 2005; Musick et al., 1999; Oman et al., 1999;
Shmotkin et al., 2003). Using the Cox proportional hazards model, these papers
compute hazard ratios for mortality that indicate the relative risk of mortality com-
pared to a reference group conditional on control variables and find lower mortal-
ity risk among volunteers relative to non-volunteers. An issue with these studies
is that it is not clear if volunteering is reducing the risk of death or if people with
a low risk of mortality are participating in volunteering from the outset.
There is, however, one paper that exploits a difference in timing to address
the endogeneity of volunteering. Luoh & Herzog (2002) estimate its effect on the
mortality of volunteers and find that elderly Americans who engaged in volunteer
work for 100 hours or more are less likely to die relative to those who volunteered
for fewer than 100 hours. Their analytical strategy is to regress mortality status in
period t on volunteer participation status in period t−1 to identify the causal effect
of volunteering on mortality, controlling for health status prior to participation in
volunteer work (i.e., health status in period t − 2). A potential issue with their
approach is that estimates of the effect of volunteering are biased if time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity that affects the health status of an individual is also
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correlated with the volunteer participation status of the individual.2
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.1 explains the
effect of the earthquake on volunteering. In Section 2.2, we show the economet-
ric specification and discuss the identification strategy. Section 2.3 presents data
sources, while Section 2.4 discusses the empirical findings. Section 2.5 checks
the robustness of the results, and Section 2.6 concludes the paper.
2.1 Effect of the Earthquake on Volunteering
Shortly after the earthquake, a large number of volunteers from different parts
of Japan gathered in the disaster area to provide emergency support, such as
transporting relief, managing asylums, providing meals and nursing. A total
of 1,377 thousand people volunteered over a year after the earthquake, approx-
imately 70 per cent of whom were participating in volunteering for the first time
(Hyogo Prefecture, 1996). Their activities attracted the attention of the media
and were broadcast across Japan. Since then, volunteering has become a popular
activity among the public, as is shown by the fact that 1995 is called “Volunteer
Gannen”, meaning “the starting year of volunteerism”.3
2Another potential issue is that Luoh & Herzog (2002) group those who did not volunteer and
those who volunteered fewer than 100 hours into the same category and use them as a reference
group. In other words, the reference group also contains those who participated in volunteer work;
thus, it is hard to interpret their estimates. In addition, the previous literature uses different cut-off
values for measures of volunteering, e.g., the cut-off value of 40 hours in Musick et al. (1999),
while the value is 100 hours in Luoh & Herzog (2002). It is therefore not clear how robust their
results are to different cut-off values.
3Although volunteer activities had been taking place even before 1995, the activities were
mainly conducted by people in, for example, certain religious or political groups and were not
necessarily popular activities among the public.
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Figure 2.1: Characteristics of Volunteers
I. Volunteers by Age
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II. Volunteers by Occupation
0 10 20 30 40 50
% over the total number of volunteers
others
retired
housewife
self−employed
employee
student
Source: 1997 Report on Trend in Volunteer Activities
In this paper, we focus on the volunteers registered to the Hyogo Council of
Social Welfare. These volunteers are based in the Hyogo prefecture and engage in
activities that mainly target the elderly (Hyogo Council of Social Welfare, 1997).
As of 2000, approximately 83 per cent of the volunteer activities target the el-
derly at home, and the rest targets the disabled and people in hospitals and care
homes. The main activities of the volunteers are to deliver meals, visit houses,
hospitals and care homes for a chat, organise community gatherings and provide
assistance for daily tasks (e.g., housework). Figure 2.1 summarises the charac-
teristics of volunteers. Panel I indicates that people in their 60s account for the
largest proportion of volunteers, 25.4 per cent. People in their 50s are the second
largest, 23.2 per cent, implying that these two age bands account for about half of
volunteers. Panel II presents the occupational composition of volunteers. A no-
ticeable feature of the occupational composition is that housewives alone account
for nearly half of volunteers. In the municipalities hit by the earthquake, the level
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of volunteering jumped up after the earthquake, whereas it evolved smoothly in
other municipalities.
Figure 2.2 plots the level of volunteers in the municipalities hit by the earth-
quake relative to those not hit by the earthquake. For example, the relative level of
volunteers plotted on the y-axis equals 0.1 if the number of volunteers in the mu-
nicipalities hit by the earthquake was 10 per cent higher, and it equals zero if there
is no difference in the number of volunteers in the two groups. The graph shows
that the level of volunteers was similar in the two groups before the earthquake
in 1995. Although the relative level of volunteers in the municipalities hit by the
earthquake seems to slightly increase during the pre-quake period, the difference
is not statistically different from zero. In contrast, the level of volunteers sharply
increased after the earthquake by approximately 20 to 25 per cent and stayed at
the higher level, implying that the earthquake caused a persistent rather than a
temporary increase in the level of volunteers.
2.2 Identification Strategy
We now turn to a discussion of identification strategy. This study explores the
causal effect of volunteering on elderly mortality by regressing mortality on a
measure of volunteering, controlling for various socio-economic indicators. The
following model is set up:
ln(#deaths)it = β0 +β1ln(#volunteers)it +X ′itγ+νi + τt + εit (2.1)
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Figure 2.2: Relative Level of Volunteers in the Treatment Group
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Notes: The figure plots the level of volunteers in the treatment group relative to
the control group after controlling for income per capita, unemployment rate, sex
ratio, the number of the elderly, the number of divorces, high school participation
rate, elderly medical expenditure per capita, and municipality and year fixed ef-
fects. A municipality is classified as treated if the municipality recorded a positive
level of physical damage due to the earthquake. Two grey lines indicate 95 percent
confidence intervals.
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where ln(#deaths)it represents the logged number of deaths in municipality i in
year t and ln(#volunteers)it is the logged number of volunteers. The time varying
socio-economic characteristics, Xit , and parameter, γ , are K×1 vectors, where K
is the number of socio-economic indicators. νi and τt are the municipality and
year fixed effects, respectively, and εit is the disturbance term.
The main coefficient of interest is β1 that measures the effect of volunteering
on mortality. An econometric issue in the estimation of equation (2.1) is endo-
geneity of volunteering. Specifically, unobserved heterogeneity such as the quality
of local health care service may affect both mortality and the level of volunteer-
ing. It may also be the case that there are more volunteers in the municipalities
with a large number of vulnerable people such as the elderly (reverse causality).
If it is the case, the OLS estimator for β1 is biased. An unbiased estimator can be
obtained by using the IV estimator that requires an instrument giving exogenous
variation in volunteering.
In this chapter, physical damage caused by the earthquake is used as an instru-
ment for volunteering. In order for the physical damage to be a valid instrument,
we require an assumption that, conditional on volunteering, the physical damage
has no direct effect on mortality. The nature of the instrument, however, raises
several concerns about the validity of the assumption. Firstly, 6,434 people were
killed by the earthquake and thus the identifying assumption does not hold in the
year 1995. Apart from the accidental deaths due to the earthquake, chronic ill-
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nesses may have deteriorated due to unfamiliar lives in asylums or other quake
related disruptions in daily life, which may have lead to an increase in mortality.
To address the temporary increase in mortality in the aftermath of the earth-
quake, we omit the year 1995 from the sample. The earthquake occurred in Jan-
uary 1995 and the peak number of refugees recorded was 316,678 in January
1995. The number of refugees steadily decreased as (re)construction of houses
and temporary housing proceeded and 97 per cent of refugees left asylums by Au-
gust 1995. The earthquake also caused serious damage to infrastructure: water,
electricity, gas supply and phone lines were cut off in the disaster area.4 Repairs
of the infrastructure was, however, extremely rapid. Electricity and phone lines
were repaired by the end of January 1995, and water and gas supplies resumed
by the end of April 1995. Medical facilities were also heavily damaged by the
earthquake. As of January 1995, 33 per cent of hospitals and clinics in the Hyogo
prefecture were closed due to damage to buildings or disruption in infrastructure.
Within a month, however, 70 per cent of hospitals and clinics had resumed op-
erations, and subsequently, 93 per cent resumed operations by the end of 1995.
Omitting year 1995 from the sample, therefore, also addresses the possibility of
an increase in mortality induced by a temporary disruption in daily life, infras-
tructure and medical facilities.
Nevertheless, there may still be a concern that the damage of the earthquake
had long-term consequences on mortality even after omitting year 1995 from the
4Water, electricity, gas supply and phone lines were cut off in 1,270, 2,600, 845 and 100
thousand households, respectively, immediately after the earthquake.
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sample. For instance, the earthquake may have disproportionately killed infirm
people such as the elderly, leading to a lower mortality afterwards because rela-
tively fitter people survived. It could also be the case that the mental stress induced
by facing the deaths of a large number of people or losing houses, for example,
had a persistent effect on mortality even after 1995. To address these concerns,
we further restrict the sample and drop a set of municipalities heavily damaged
by the earthquake. Figure 2.3 shows municipalities in the Hyogo prefecture ac-
cording to their damage status. The shaded area in Figure 2.3 corresponds to a set
of municipalities that recorded positive levels of physical damage. Among the set
of municipalities with damage, the grey area corresponds to a subset of munici-
palities that recorded moderate damage, while the black area corresponds to those
heavily damaged.5 These are the four municipalities close to the epicentre, which
account for a substantial amount of physical damage due to the earthquake: 98, 85
and 88 per cent of the total deaths, serious injury and full destruction of houses,
respectively.
Omitting these municipalities has several implications. Firstly, most individu-
als who died due to the earthquake were living in these heavily damaged munic-
ipalities. If the earthquake killed vulnerable people disproportionately, it would
thus have happened in these omitted municipalities. Secondly, if the mental stress
caused by, for example, experiencing a large number of deaths in a neighbour-
hood or severe destruction of houses had a long-term effect on mortality, it would
5A municipality recorded above the 75th percentile value of deaths is classified as a heavily
damaged municipality. In the section of robustness checks, different definitions of heavily dam-
aged municipalities are used.
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have affected mortality in omitted municipalities. Furthermore, approximately
98 per cent of refugees stayed in these municipalities. Therefore, if a life in asy-
lums had a long-term effect on mortality, it is likely to have happened in these
municipalities. Finally, as mentioned earlier, medical facilities were also heavily
damaged by the earthquake. Given that most disruptions in medical facilities were
restored by the end of 1995, any effect of the disruptions on mortality is likely to
be accounted for by omitting the year 1995 from the sample.
Nevertheless, one may still be concerned that the disruption in medical fa-
cilities had long-term consequences. For example, a chronic disease might have
deteriorated because one could not obtain adequate medical treatment in 1995.
Omitting municipalities heavily damaged by the earthquake addresses these types
of concerns since medical facilities that experienced heavy damage were concen-
trated in the omitted municipalities.6 Block I of Table 2.1 presents the average de-
struction due to the earthquake in the treatment and control municipalities. Recall
that a municipality is categorised as treated if the municipality recorded a positive
level of physical damage due to the earthquake. The average destruction in con-
trol municipalities is therefore equal to zero by construction. Block I indicates that
approximately 0.5 per cent of people were injured and approximately 10 per cent
of households had their houses damaged in the treatment municipalities. As ex-
pected, the proportion of people who died, 0.006 per cent, is not great given that
the most heavily damaged municipalities are omitted from the sample.
6As of 27th February 1995, about 99 per cent of hospitals and clinics closed were located in
the omitted municipalities.
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Figure 2.3: Municipalities by Damage Status
Notes: The cross indicates the epicentre. The black area is a subset of municipal-
ities heavily damaged by the earthquake and omitted from the sample, while the
grey area is a subset of municipalities suffered moderate damage. A municipality
is classified as heavily damaged if the municipality was recorded above the 75th
percentile value of the distribution of the death measure. Death is measured by the
number of deaths due to the earthquake, such as being crushed or killed in a fire.
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Table 2.1: Municipality Characteristics
Treatment Control
28 municipalities 56 municipalities
Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. p-value
I. Destruction due to the Quake
Death per 1,000 pop 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.00 -
Injured per 1,000 pop 5.45 3.05 0.00 0.00 -
Destroyed hh per 1,000 hh 114.35 65.28 0.00 0.00 -
II. Demography
Sex ratio 0.97 0.12 0.93 0.05 0.75
% Pop under 15 18.70 5.14 19.08 2.11 0.94
% Pop over 65 11.14 2.95 16.03 1.55 0.11
% Divorced 2.44 0.86 1.76 0.23 0.33
% Widowed 7.38 2.01 10.24 1.04 0.16
In-migration per 1,000 pop 46.07 5.51 32.25 1.87 0.00
Out-migration per 1,000 pop 44.92 6.02 34.34 1.82 0.03
III. Education
% Compulsory 22.45 6.15 31.54 2.96 0.14
% High school 33.44 9.73 30.22 3.67 0.71
% University 14.89 4.44 10.15 1.31 0.20
IV. Economy
% Unemployed 1.68 0.56 1.21 0.17 0.32
% Employed 47.42 13.61 48.21 5.27 0.95
Income per cap 1,400 177 1,128 61 0.07
Medical exp per cap 637 84 516 27 0.09
Notes: Mean refers to weighted means where population is used as weights. Standard errors are
reported next to the means. Block I presents figures as of 1995, whereas Blocks II to IV show the
average during pre-quake period, i.e., between 1990 and 1994. p-value corresponds to p-values of
t-tests under the null hypothesis of equality of means between the treatment and control groups.
Each label of variables in Block I indicates the following: number of deaths due to the direct
effect of the earthquake, number of people injured, and number of households whose houses are
destroyed. Sex ratio corresponds to the number of males relative to females. % divorced and
widowed are defined over people aged 15 or above. Per capita taxable income and public medical
expenditure for the elderly are measured in ¥1,000.
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For the identification of the causal effect of volunteering, it is important that
the treatment and control municipalities had similar characteristics prior to the
earthquake. Blocks II to IV of Table 2.1 compare the pre-treatment character-
istics of the two groups. Block I indicates that there is no important difference
in sex and age compositions, divorce rate and widowed rate. However, treated
municipalities display higher in-migration and out-migration rates. The different
migration patterns bias the results if the pattern is correlated with mortality and
different between treatment and control groups. For example, elderly people in
the treatment group may have moved out after the earthquake in search of better
medical facilities. Given that the data on the characteristics of migrants, such as
age, are not available, it is not possible to track who migrated.
If the migration pattern is correlated with mortality (or age), however, the mi-
gration would have affected the age compositions of the two groups. To check this
possibility, we conduct a t-test under the null hypothesis of constant differences in
the percentage of people under 15, between 15 and 65, and over 65 between the
two groups before and after the earthquake. The null hypothesis is not rejected for
every age band, implying that there is no evidence that different migration rates
altered age compositions in the two groups. Block III suggests that the level of
educational attainment is higher in the treatment than in the control group but the
difference is not statistically significant. With regard to characteristics related to
the labour market and the economy, the percentages of unemployment and em-
ployment are similar in the two groups as shown in Block IV. Per capita income
and public elderly medical expenditure are higher in the treatment group, but the
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Figure 2.4: Volunteers per elderly person
Treatment
Control
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
year
Notes: Solid and dotted lines correspond to the weighted average number of volun-
teers per person aged 80 or older in the treated and control municipalities, respec-
tively. Weights are elderly population and quake damage.
differences are not statistically significant.
The identification of the effect of volunteering also requires that trends in the
treatment and control groups were the same prior to the earthquake. Figure 2.4
plots the weighted-average number of volunteers per elderly person in the treated
and control municipalities.7 Figure 2.4 shows that pre-quake trends in the number
of volunteers were similar between the two groups. The two series, however, di-
verge after the earthquake, and the treated municipalities exhibit a higher number
of volunteers per elderly person. Turning to mortality, Figure 2.5 plots the average
7Elderly people correspond to those aged 80 or older. Changing the definition of old people
does not significantly alter the graph. The weights are elderly population and quake damage.
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number of deaths by age cohort. Mortality is expressed per 1,000 people in the
corresponding age cohort. Not surprisingly, Figure 2.5 shows sharp spikes in the
year of the earthquake, 1995, regardless of age cohort. The pre-quake trends in
mortality were similar across two groups in every age cohort, with slightly steeper
downward trends in the control group for mortality of people in their 70s and 80s
or older, potentially leading to the underestimation of the effect of volunteering.
After the earthquake, the mortality of people in their 80s or older in the treat-
ment group appears to decrease to a greater extent, while such a pattern was not
observed in any other age cohort.
2.3 Data and Variables
Our sample consists of observations for 88 municipalities in the Hyogo prefecture
from 1990 to 2000. Mortality data are obtained from the Current Population Sur-
vey (Jinko Dotai Chosa) conducted every year by the Ministry of Health, Labour
and Welfare. The survey has been conducted since 1898 and collects data on
birth, death, stillbirth, marriage and divorce. Data on age-specific mortality (i.e.,
the number of people who died in their 50s, 60s, 70s, and 80s or older) are taken
from the survey.
Data on volunteering are available from the Report on the Activity of the
Hyogo Council of Social Welfare (Kennai Syakyo Katsudo Genkyo Chosa). The
report provides various figures related to volunteering, such as the number of vol-
unteers and voluntary groups at the municipality level in the Hyogo prefecture.
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Figure 2.5: Mortality Rate by Age Cohort
I. Mortality of people in their 50s
Treatment
Control
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year
II. Mortality of people in their 60s
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Control
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year
III. Mortality of people in their 70s
Treatment
Control
26
28
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IV. Mortality of people in their 80s+
Treatment
Control
95
10
0
10
5
11
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year
Notes: Solid and dotted lines correspond to the weighted average number of deaths per 1,000
persons by age cohort in the treatment and control municipalities, respectively. Weights are popu-
lation in the corresponding age cohort.
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Characteristics of care receivers and the problems and challenges that volunteer
activities in Hyogo face are also described in the report. It is a detailed and useful
source of information about volunteering in the Hyogo prefecture and is available
from 1990 onwards. The descriptions of characteristics of volunteers and vol-
unteer activities are, however, rather narrative; thus, it is difficult to understand
a statistical overview of the characteristics. We therefore also extract data from
the Report on the Trend in Volunteer Activity (Volunteer Katsudo Doko Chosa
Hokokusyo). It is a survey report of a survey on volunteering in the Hyogo pre-
fecture that has been conducted every four years since 1984. The survey collects
various information about volunteering, such as sex, age and occupation of vol-
unteers, frequency of volunteer activity and the financial conditions of volunteer
groups. Data on the characteristics of volunteers and contents of volunteer work
are obtained from the survey report.
Information on the physical damage due to the earthquake is provided by the
disaster prevention division of the Hyogo prefecture. The document reports phys-
ical damage due to the earthquake officially confirmed by the Fire and Disaster
Management Agency of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.
The earthquake damage is categorised into loss of life and damage to buildings,
and each category is further divided into sub-categories according to the extent of
damage.
Public medical expenditure for the elderly is obtained from the National Health
Insurance and Health Insurance for the Aged in Hyogo (Hyogo no Kokuho Rouken)
from 1990 to 2000. The document summarises public expenditures related to
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health at the municipality level in the Hyogo prefecture. Data on covariates other
than the public medical expenditure are obtained from a survey report, the Sys-
tem of Social and Demographic Statistics of Japan (Syakai Jinko Tokei Taikei).
The survey covers every municipality in Japan and collects information on the
socio-economic and demographic conditions of municipalities. The survey has
been conducted since 1976 and provides 1,500 social and demographic variables
by municipality. As socio-economic indicators, we use municipality-level mea-
sures of economic activity, demography and educational level: taxable income
per capita, unemployment rate, sex ratio, population, number of divorces and high
school participation rate. The first lag of population is used because mortality and
population in period t are simultaneously determined.
2.4 Results
We begin by presenting the OLS estimates of equation 2.1. Table 2.2 shows the
estimates of regressions in which age-specific mortality is regressed on municipal-
ity and year fixed effects, and other controls between 1990 and 2000. Dependent
variables in columns (1) to (4) correspond to the logged number of people who
died in their 50s, 60s, 70s, and 80s or older, respectively. Table 2.2 indicates that
every coefficient estimate is not statistically different from zero, implying that vol-
unteering has no effect on mortality at any age. The OLS estimator is, however,
biased if (i) unobserved heterogeneity across municipalities that affects mortality
is also correlated with the number of volunteers or (ii) levels of mortality and vol-
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Table 2.2: Effects of Volunteering on Age Specific Mortality (OLS estimates)
Dependent Var. # Deaths in 50s # Deaths in 60s # Deaths in 70s # Deaths in 80s+
(1) (2) (3) (4)
# Volunteers 0.033 0.005 -0.016 0.004
(0.027) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010)
Controls yes yes yes yes
Municip. FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
# Obs. 824 837 837 837
# Municip. 84 84 84 84
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by municipality. The dependent variables are the logged
number of age-specific deaths. Controls included into the analysis are income per capita, unem-
ployment rate, sex ratio, population, number of divorces, high school participation rate, elderly
medical expenditure per capita, and municipality and year fixed effects. Columns (1) to (4) use
the number of people in their 50s, 60s, 70s and 80s or older, respectively, as a population measure.
Every variable in level is logged.
unteers are simultaneously determined. To address the possible endogeneity of
volunteering, we estimate equation 2.1 using the IV estimator.
Panel I of Table 2.3 shows estimates of the first-stage equation. The earthquake
damage is measured by percentage of people injured.8 The damage indicator is
equal to zero in every municipality before the earthquake and takes a positive
value, for example, 10, after the earthquake if 10 per cent of the population is
injured in a municipality. Odd-numbered columns correspond to a specification
that controls only for municipality and year fixed effects. Estimates indicate pos-
itive effects of the earthquake damage on volunteering, and the effects are highly
statistically significant.
8Other damage indicators are used in Section 2.5 as a robustness check.
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Odd-numbered columns are, however, not correctly specified if any differ-
ence across municipalities that varies over time affects mortality. To account for
time varying heterogeneity across municipalities that may affect mortality, socio-
economic indicators are added to specifications in the even-numbered columns.
The results are robust to the inclusion of additional controls, and the effect of
earthquake damage on volunteering remains highly statistically significant. Col-
umn (8) of Panel I indicates that a one-percentage-point increase in the percentage
of people injured raises the number of volunteers by approximately 22 per cent on
average, ceteris paribus.
Note that the F-statistic reported in the last row of Table 2.3 clearly exceeds
10. It is important for the identification that the instrument is not weak, mean-
ing that the instrument and the level of volunteering are highly correlated. A
weak instrument is known to bias the IV estimator toward the probability limit of
the corresponding OLS estimator. Stock et al. (2002) compute the critical value
for the weak instrument test based on the first-stage F statistic and suggest that
an F-statistic above approximately 10 makes IV inference reliable. We therefore
conclude that we do not have a weak instrument problem.
Panel II of Table 2.3 summarises the IV estimates of equation 2.1. The esti-
mates presented in odd-numbered columns indicate that volunteering has no ef-
fect on mortality of people in their 50s and 60s, while it significantly reduces
mortality among people in their 70s and 80s or older. The significance of the
estimates remains unchanged after adding socio-economic indicators as controls,
and the results reconfirm the previous findings. Column (8) of panel II suggests
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that a one-percentage-point increase in the number of volunteers reduces mortal-
ity among people in their 80s or older by approximately 0.14 per cent on average,
ceteris paribus. Evaluated at the mean, the estimate implies that roughly one life
of people aged 80 or older (out of 186 persons) was saved in a given year when
volunteers increased by 100 (out of 1,911 persons).
Our estimates capture the net effect of volunteering on mortality and thus do
not allow us to determine whether the reduction in mortality is driven by that of
volunteers or care recipients. The reduction in mortality of people in their 80s or
older is, however, likely to have occurred among recipients given that every volun-
teer was younger than 80 (Hyogo Council of Social Welfare, 1997). We therefore
conclude that the reduction in mortality of people in their 80s or older is caused by
that of care receivers. The effect on people in their 70s is inconclusive given that
13 per cent of volunteers in our sample are those in their 70s. It is, however, likely
that the reduction in mortality occurred among care recipients because volunteers
are presumably fit enough to participate in volunteer activities and are also fitter
than care recipients. This inference is further strengthened by the fact that volun-
teering had no effect on the mortality of people in their 50s and 60s. As roughly
half of volunteers were aged between 50 and 69, we would observe a reduction in
mortality of people in their 50s and 60s if volunteering reduced mortality of vol-
unteers themselves.9 It has been established that volunteering reduces mortality
9The estimates in Table 2.3 capture a contemporaneous effect of volunteering on mortality;
hence, they reflect a short-run effect of volunteering. Table 2.3 indicates that the short-run mor-
tality of people in their 50s and 60s is not affected by volunteer work. This, however, does not
exclude the possibility that volunteering affects mortality of those in their 50s and 60s later in their
lives.
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of the elderly. The results are, however, not informative about the mechanisms
through which volunteering affects mortality. To infer the operating mechanisms,
we regress volunteering on mortality decomposed by cause of death. Although it
is at best suggestive evidence, examining the types of deaths affected by volun-
teering would help to narrow down the potential operating mechanisms. Several
possible channels are discussed below.
Firstly, it may be the case that volunteering enhances social contact (e.g.,
Oman et al., 1999) and more social contact subsequently leads to better health
and lower risk of mortality (House et al., 1988). Interactions with volunteers may
encourage positive emotions, such as happiness and a sense of security, which
serves to reduce stressors and thereby improve the health status of an individual.
The link between stressors and health status is well documented. For example,
Kiecolt-Glaser & Glaser (1995) find evidence that stressors affect the immune
system, which in turn influences cancer and infectious illness progression.
Secondly, using volunteer services means that someone visits the elderly reg-
ularly, implying that the elderly are found relatively quickly if they, for example,
have a heart attack or slip in a bathroom. This is a potentially important chan-
nel given that “kodokushi”, meaning “dying alone”, is an important social issue
among the elderly in Japan. Since the 1970s, there have been numerous accidents
in which the elderly living alone were found dead in their houses some time after
they have passed away. The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare launched a
project to fight against “kodokushi”, and a project report highlights the importance
of social contact as a means to prevent “kodokushi” of the elderly. In a similar
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vein, regular visits from volunteers also imply that the elderly are provided with
much care relative to the absence of volunteers. Recalling that one of the main ac-
tivities of volunteers is to provide meals, volunteers may help the elderly to have
well-balanced meals or remind them to take medicine, which may subsequently
improve their general health conditions.
Table 2.4 reports the IV estimates of the effect of volunteering on cause-
specific mortality.10 The results indicate that volunteering significantly reduces
mortality caused by cerebral vascular disease, heart disease and decrepitude but
has no significant effect on mortality caused by cancer, high blood pressure, pneu-
monia, diabetes and accidental death. Many diseases categorised as cerebral vas-
cular disease and heart disease are acute diseases such as stroke, intracerebral
bleeding and heart attack. Volunteering may thus have reduced mortality caused
by these diseases by providing quicker access to medical help when the elderly
suffered acute diseases. The inference is further strengthened by the fact that vol-
unteering had no effect on mortality caused by high blood pressure and diabetes
that are some of the main causes of cerebral vascular disease and heart disease.
If volunteering reduced mortality due to cerebral vascular disease and heart dis-
ease by helping the elderly to recover from these illnesses, it would have also
affected mortality due to diseases that caused cerebral vascular disease and heart
disease. Furthermore, given that the estimates in Table 2.4 are that of the short-
10A caveat is that data on mortality by cause are available by municipality but not by age. Since
a type of mortality prevalent among young people, such as mortality related to delivery or suicide,
is irrelevant to our analysis, we run regressions only on types of mortality prevalent among people
in their 70s or older.
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Table 2.4: Effects of Volunteering on Cause Specific Mortality (IV estimates)
Dependent Variable: ln(# of deaths by cause)
Causes of Death
(1) Cerebral vascular disease -0.261***
(0.079)
(2) Heart disease -0.182***
(0.064)
(3) Decrepitude -0.283**
(0.123)
(4) Cancer -0.058
(0.043)
(5) High blood pressure -0.056
(0.084)
(6) Pneumonia -0.058
(0.094)
(7) Diabetes -0.014
(0.155)
(8) Accidental death 0.089
(0.069)
Controls yes
Municip. FE yes
Year FE yes
# Obs 837
# Municip. 84
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by municipality. *** denotes p<0.01 and **
denotes p<0.05. Controls included into the analysis are income per capita, un-
employment rate, sex ratio, total population, the number of divorces, high school
participation rate, elderly medical expenditure per capita, and municipality and year
fixed effects. Every variable in level is logged. Damage indicator corresponds to
percentage of people injured.
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to medium-term effects of volunteering, it would not be plausible that mortality
caused by these serious illnesses is affected by volunteers in the short run.
The significant reduction in mortality caused by decrepitude means that the
elderly with no particular known disease who would otherwise have passed away
in the absence of volunteers lived longer. A possible interpretation is that volun-
teers helped to improve general health conditions of the elderly by providing them
with well-balanced meals or enabling them to exercise when they might otherwise
have been confined to bed.
Mortality caused by illnesses documented to be affected by an improvement
in immune system strength, such as cancer, high blood pressure and infectious
illnesses (pneumonia), was not affected by volunteering. The results imply that
the reduced stress channel is unlikely to be an operating mechanism.11 Diabetes
is also driven by stress, as well as by genes, malnutrition and obesity. Apparently,
volunteering does not affect mortality due to diabetes caused by genetic factors.
Volunteering could potentially reduce mortality caused by diabetes via improved
nutritional status of the elderly, but the process would take a longer period of time
than what we are currently looking at.
The insignificant effect of accidental deaths seems plausible. One of the main
causes of accidental deaths is traffic accidents. Given that most volunteer activi-
ties take place indoors (e.g., providing meals), accidental deaths are likely to be
11An important caveat for the interpretation is that estimates in Table 2.4 are that of short- to
medium-term effects. Insignificant effects on mortality caused by cancer, high blood pressure,
diabetes and pneumonia in the short run do not exclude the possibility that volunteering affects
mortality caused by these diseases in the longer term.
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irrelevant to volunteering. Alternatively, our measure of mortality due to accidents
may not be sufficiently precise to capture the effects of volunteering on acciden-
tal deaths of the elderly, as approximately 40 per cent of people who died due to
accidental deaths were younger than 70 years of age.
2.5 Robustness Checks
This section firstly conducts a series of placebo tests to ensure that the observed
increase in volunteering is not spurious. Secondly, we examine the robustness of
the results to different sample specifications to establish that the results in the pre-
vious section are not a product of mere coincidence using a specific sample. We
then show that the results are not sensitive to different regression specifications.
Finally, some additional results are presented to establish that the results are not
driven by some unobserved factors correlated with volunteering that reduce mor-
tality in general.
Firstly, one may be concerned that the results are driven by a difference in
the pre-quake characteristics of volunteering. It might be the case that damaged
municipalities lie in an area with a high risk of earthquakes and therefore norms
of cooperation are well developed, leading to a high level of volunteering even
prior to the earthquake in 1995. To address this concern, we falsely assign the
earthquake damage to the pre-quake period. Damage indicators are now included
separately by year and equal positive values from 1991 to 2000 in the municipal-
ities with positive levels of damage and zero otherwise. The damage indicator in
81
year 1990 is omitted as the default year.
The estimates reported in Panel A of Table 2.5 indicate a significantly lower
level of volunteering (approximately two per cent) in the treatment group in 1991.
Although it does not support the hypothesis that the level of volunteering was
higher in the treatment group even before the earthquake, the significant differ-
ence is potentially worrying if the difference is not constant and persists through-
out the pre-quake period.12 The result, however, shows no statistically significant
difference after 1991 prior to the earthquake. In contrast, there is a persistent
and statistically significant difference after the earthquake. We therefore conclude
that the findings in the previous section are unlikely to be driven by a pre-quake
difference in volunteering. An interesting point to note is that the level of volun-
teering sharply increased by 20 to 25 per cent after the earthquake and stayed at
almost the same level, implying that the earthquake caused a persistent rather than
a temporary change in volunteering.
In a similar vein, it might also be the case that norms of cooperation are more
developed in municipalities closer to the fault because the damaged municipali-
ties lie in an area with a high risk of earthquakes. To address this concern, we
omit the treatment group from our sample and falsely assign treatment status to
municipalities lying just outside of the original treatment group (fake treatment
group). The municipalities retained in the sample (i.e., the fake treatment group
and the control group) did not record any damage due to the earthquake and thus
were presumably unaffected by the earthquake, while the fake treatment group
12If the difference is systematic, it is absorbed by the municipality fixed effects.
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Table 2.5: Falsification Exercises
Dependent Variable: ln(# of volunteers)
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4)
% injured 1991 -0.022** -0.023** -0.023** -0.023**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
% injured 1992 -0.004 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006
(0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080)
% injured 1993 0.044 0.042 0.043 0.041
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069)
% injured 1994 0.057 0.057 0.055 0.074
(0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.091)
% injured 1996 0.228** 0.231** 0.228** 0.245**
(0.099) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100)
% injured 1997 0.233** 0.234** 0.231** 0.251**
(0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.096)
% injured 1998 0.216*** 0.217*** 0.214*** 0.234***
(0.073) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
% injured 1999 0.195** 0.198** 0.197** 0.218***
(0.077) (0.078) (0.079) (0.076)
% injured 2000 0.229*** 0.233*** 0.231*** 0.254***
(0.066) (0.067) (0.069) (0.066)
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4)
fake treatment 0.009 -0.003 0.052 -0.002
(0.198) (0.175) (0.172) (0.164)
Controls yes yes yes yes
Municip. FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by municipality. *** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05 and
* refers to p<0.1. Dependent variable is the logged number of volunteers. Controls included in the
analysis are income per capita, unemployment rate, sex ratio, population, the number of divorces,
high school participation rate, elderly medical expenditure per capita, and municipality and year
fixed effects. Measures of population differ by column: columns (1) to (4) control for the number
of people in their 50s, 60s, 70s, and 80s or older, respectively. Every variable in level is logged.
Damage indicator corresponds to percentage of people injured. Panel A falsely assigns damage
indicator to the pre-quake period, i.e., year<1995. The sampled municipalities are the treatment
group, where four most heavily damaged municipalities are omitted, and the control group (84
municipalities) except Panel B (the control and outer control groups, 58 municipalities).
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lies closer to the fault. Panel B of Table 2.5 presents the coefficient estimates on
a fake treatment dummy that equals one for municipalities in the fake treatment
group after the earthquake and zero otherwise. The estimates show no statistically
significant difference between the fake treatment and control groups, suggesting
that the results in the previous section are unlikely to be driven by a difference in
volunteering according to geographical proximity to the fault.13
Secondly, a series of robustness checks are conducted using different sample
specifications. Recall that we omit heavily damaged municipalities close to the
epicentre from the sample to address a concern that the earthquake damage or the
earthquake-related disruption had a long-term effect on mortality (cf. Figure 2.3).
Given that loss of life was concentrated in the four omitted municipalities, a long-
term effect of the earthquake on mortality is likely to be taken care of. One may
be concerned, however, that the results are sensitive to the sample specification.
To address this concern, we present the results based on the full sample and the
samples without the one to five most heavily damaged municipalities. The dis-
tribution of mortality due to the earthquake is highly negatively skewed, and the
heaviest damaged municipality, Kobe, alone accounts for 71 per cent of the total
number of deaths. Following Kobe, the top two to five most heavily damaged
municipalities account for 89 per cent, 96 per cent, 98 per cent and 98 per cent of
13There are two municipalities in the treatment group that recorded one person lightly injured
and geographically detached from the rest of municipalities. We treat these two municipalities as
if there was no one injured and included them in the control group because the objective of this
exercise is to check if the level of volunteering differs according to geographical proximity to the
fault. Treating the two municipalities as the treatment group and omitting them from the sample
yields qualitatively similar results.
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the total deaths, respectively.
Table 2.6 presents a series of robustness checks where alternative definitions
of heavily damaged municipalities are used. First-stage estimates are robust to
different sample specifications and always highly statistically significant. An in-
teresting point to note is that the magnitudes of the coefficients tend to increase as
more municipalities are omitted up to four municipalities, implying that the level
of volunteering increased most not in the most heavily damaged but in moderately
damaged municipalities. A possible interpretation is that people in the most heav-
ily damaged area could not afford to volunteer because they themselves or their
houses were heavily damaged. In contrast, people in the moderately damaged area
understood the importance of cooperation as they themselves had been affected by
the earthquake, but because they did not suffer heavy damage, they could afford to
volunteer and help others. Consequently, the notion of volunteering may have de-
veloped more in the moderately damaged area. The IV estimates in Table 2.6 also
reconfirm the previous findings that volunteering had no statistically significant
effect on mortality of people in their 50s and 60s, while it significantly reduced
mortality of people in their 70s and 80s or older.
One may be concerned that the results in the previous section are a product
of mere coincidence using a particular damage indicator, percentage of people
injured, as an instrument. We now investigate if the results are robust to different
choices of damage indicators. Panel A-1 of Table 2.7 reports the results where
volunteering is instrumented with four different damage indicators: percentage
of (i) people seriously injured, (ii) people lightly injured, (iii) households whose
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houses are fully destroyed and (iv) households whose houses are half destroyed.
Panel A-1 indicates that earthquake damage had significantly raised the level of
volunteering regardless of types of damage indicators, which in turn significantly
reduced mortality of people in their 70s and 80s or older. We thus conclude that
the results in the previous section are not a product of mere coincidence of using
a particular instrument.
To address a concern that the earthquake had damaged medical facilities and
subsequently affected mortality, the year 1995 and a subset of municipalities heav-
ily damaged by the earthquake were omitted. Given that most damaged medical
facilities resumed operations by the end of 1995 and were located in the omitted
municipalities, the concern is likely to be taken care of. Nevertheless, we con-
trol for the supply of medical facilities, measured by the number of hospitals and
clinics, to investigate if the main findings are not driven by omitting the relevant
variable. A limitation of this approach is that the data on the number of medical
facilities have a few missing values, particularly in rural areas.
Panel A-2 of Table 2.7 reports coefficient estimates of equation (2.1) with an
additional control, the number of medical facilities. The sample size is smaller due
to missing values, and standard errors are higher compared to the corresponding
estimates in Table 2.4.14 The effect of volunteering on mortality of people in
their 70s seems to be sensitive to the inclusion of this variable: the size of the
coefficient estimate is reduced, and the effect is not significant. In contrast, the
14The sample size in Panel A-2 of Table 2.7 is 706 (cf. 837 in Table 2.3), except for the re-
gression of mortality of people in their 50s where the sample size is 694 (cf. 824 in Table 2.3).
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effect on mortality of people in their 80s or older remains significant, and the
estimated elasticity of volunteering is now larger in absolute value, -0.235. It
might be the case that the omission of this variable biased the estimate towards
zero or the effect of volunteering on elderly mortality is larger (in absolute terms)
in urban areas.15
Finally, we investigate whether the main results are not driven by some un-
observed factors correlated with volunteering by regressing volunteering on the
mortality of children and young adults. Since the volunteering in focus targets the
elderly, it should not affect the mortality of children and young adults if it is in-
deed the volunteering that drives the main results. Mortality of three different age
bands, 0 - 9, 10 - 19 and 20 - 29, is regressed on volunteering and other controls.16
Panel A-3 of Table 2.7 indicates no effect of volunteering on the mortality of chil-
dren and young adults. It is thus concluded that the main findings are not driven
by some unobserved factors correlated with volunteering that reduce mortality in
general.
15Greater supply of medical facilities is likely to reduce mortality. At the same time, there may
be more volunteering in a municipality where the supply of medical facility is scarce. If this is
the case, the negative effect of volunteering on mortality is positively biased, resulting in a bias
towards zero.
16As levels of child and young adult mortality are very low in our sample, many observations
equal zero; thus, the logged value is not defined. We therefore recode zero to one and take the log
of the recoded values to make coefficient estimates comparable to the previous results. Addition-
ally, we also try two different functional form specifications of child and young adult mortality:
(i) raw values of mortality and (ii) an indicator variable that equals one if a municipality recorded
a positive value of mortality and zero otherwise. The results are not sensitive to the specifications
of functional forms.
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2.6 Conclusions
This chapter explored the causal effect on age-specific mortality of volunteer work
that provides daily assistance to the elderly. To identify the causal effect on mor-
tality, we exploit exogenous variation in volunteering caused by the earthquake
that hit the midwestern part of Japan in 1995. The level of volunteering consider-
ably increased in municipalities hit by the earthquake, while other municipalities
with no damage did not experience such a sharp increase in volunteering. Based
on a comparison of mortality in the municipalities with and without damage, our
results suggest that volunteering has no significant effect on mortality among peo-
ple in their 50s and 60s, while it significantly reduces mortality of people in their
70s and 80s or older. The effect on mortality of people in their 80s or older is
almost double its effect on those in their 70s. Evaluated at the mean, the estimate
implies that approximately one life of people aged 80 or older (out of 186 persons)
is saved in a given year when the number of volunteers increases by 100 (out of
1,911 persons).
Although the nature of the data does not allow us to determine if the reduc-
tion in mortality occurred among volunteers or care receivers, that of people in
their 80s or older is likely to be driven by care recipients because every volunteer
is younger than 80. Our estimates capture a contemporaneous effect of volun-
teering on mortality; thus, they reflect a short-run effect of volunteering. To the
extent that volunteering also reduces mortality of volunteers in the future, effects
of volunteering on mortality may be even higher in the long run.
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We contribute to the literature on volunteering by revealing the causal effect
of volunteering on mortality. Given that population ageing is proceeding at a
considerable speed in Japan and burdening public health care expenditures, the
contribution of volunteers to support the elderly is important for the maintenance
of society. The results also have implications for other countries facing an ageing
society. The ratio of the elderly to the working-age population is highest in Japan,
36 per cent, followed by many Western European countries such as Italy and Ger-
many, both at 31 per cent (United Nations, 2011). Coupled with low birth rates,
population ageing is projected to proceed further; thus, it is important to build a
society in which not only governments but also citizens support the elderly. Fi-
nally, most volunteers in our sample are not in the labour force (e.g., housewives).
The results suggest that their activities yield social benefits; therefore, policies
that encourage or facilitate volunteering may help to mobilise (human) resources
available to society to enhance the well-being of the elderly.
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